RECYCLING MILITANTS IN INDONESIA:
DARUL ISLAM AND THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY BOMBING

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

No understanding of jihadism in Indonesia is possible without understanding the Darul Islam movement (DI) and its efforts to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia (NII)). Over the last 55 years, that movement has produced splinters and offshoots that range from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to non-violent religious groups. Every time the older generation seems on the verge of passing into irrelevance, a new generation of young militants, inspired by DI's history and the mystique of an Islamic state, emerges to give the movement a new lease on life. If the pattern outlined in this report holds, Indonesia will not be able to eradicate JI or its jihadist partners, even if it arrests every member of the central command but, with more attention to a few key measures, it ought to be able to contain them.

The DI movement, that began as separate rebellions in West Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh in the 1950s, is now one very loose but enduring web of personal contacts that extends to most of the major islands in Indonesia. The September 2004 bombing in front of the Australian embassy in Jakarta shows how some of those contacts can be brought into play.

Within days of the explosion, Indonesian police determined that two known Malaysian JI members, Azhari Husin and Noordin Mohammed Top, were involved. But it became apparent that they were working in partnership with an offshoot of DI called the Banten Ring, operating in old DI strongholds in western Java. Three of the young men recruited as suicide bombers from the Banten Ring, including one who died in the September bombing, had fathers in DI.

Examining DI's history may give us clues to understanding JI:

- The way Darul Islam survived and adapted after its defeat by the Indonesian army in the 1960s and the arrest of virtually its entire leadership in 1977-1982 suggests JI may also be able to survive the arrests and imprisonment of many of its top leaders.
- Imprisonment often enhances the credentials of DI members and rarely serves to weaken their commitment to the cause; they often emerge even from long imprisonment as energized as when they went in and recruitable for new operations.
- Rifts and power struggles at the top often have little impact on cooperation at lower levels.
- The odds against a particular operation succeeding are little deterrent to those committed to planning attacks. With "Victory or martyrdom" as the operative slogan, waging jihad against insuperable odds has its own attraction.
- Failure of older leaders to respond to particular political events may lead to the emergence of new, militant movements led by younger members angered by the inaction of their elders.
- New bonds are forged and lasting friendships made during military training programs.

All this is worrying but there is also good news. The recycling of old DI members into JI or into partnerships with JI suggests that the recruiting base for jihadists may not be expanding significantly, and that it is difficult for them to move very far beyond old DI or existing JI constituencies. Even in the DI stronghold where the foot soldiers for the Australian embassy bombing were recruited, it was difficult to find youths willing to sign up for the combination of very strict religious practice and extreme interpretation of jihad. There is no reason to think that the war in Iraq, for example, will produce a sudden spurt of new JI members, even though the unpopularity of that war and the anti-American sentiment it has fuelled will continue to complicate domestic counter-terror initiatives.

The most important variables that will determine whether jihadism is contained include whether:

- communal tensions inside Indonesia are properly managed;
law enforcement capacity is improved;

the Indonesian government gives more serious thought to the impact of prison on the jihadists in custody and what happens to them on release; and,

better control is exerted over the sale and transfer of arms, ammunition and explosives.

All these are within the control of the Indonesian government. A fourth variable is whether a new major centre of international jihadist training, such as Afghanistan once was, emerges. That depends, of course, not only, or even primarily upon the Indonesian government's actions but upon policies of the wider international community.

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RECYCLING MILITANTS IN INDONESIA:
DARUL ISLAM AND THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY BOMBING

I. INTRODUCTION

After a bomb exploded in front of the Australian embassy on 9 September 2004, evidence began to emerge almost immediately that two members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) -- Azhari Husin and Noordin Mohamed Top -- were involved. But it also became clear very quickly that they were working in partnership with an offshoot of the Darul Islam (DI) movement called Ring Banten (the Banten Ring), which had provided logistical support, field coordination and the suicide bomber.

Many questions arose about what the bombing revealed of JI's relative strength and coherence. Was it as strong or significantly weaker than a year ago? Was the central command structure still functioning or were Azhari and Noordin on their own?

These questions, while obviously important, miss a key point, which is that even if JI has been seriously weakened by arrests and other counter-terror measures put in place since the October 2002 Bali bombing, parts of the organisation, or even individuals, can continue to function in partnership with non-JI groups. But which groups and how are partnerships forged? The alliance with Ring Banten suggests it might be productive to look back at the splits and fissures in Darul Islam over the last two decades for answers.

In doing so, we found that DI is an extraordinarily resilient organisation that has gone through cycles of decline and growth, or perhaps more aptly, senescence and rejuvenation. Every time the old leadership seems to have outlived its usefulness, younger, more militant members emerge to breathe new life into the organisation and reinterpret its mission.

But every major period in DI's history has relevance for today. DI strongholds in the 1950s in many cases are now strongholds of jihadist support, even though the Indonesian political context is radically different. The bases of Ring Banten in 2004, for example, overlap with some of the last pockets of resistance to the Indonesian army in West Java in 1962.

Past and present incarnations of Darul Islam continue to provide pools of recruits from which members of jihadist organisations are drawn, as well as a support network that can provide logistical aid and shelter as needed.

Over the years, younger, more militant members of DI have formed new groups, of which JI is one. The common Darul Islam heritage is so powerful a bond that it facilitates contacts and communication across the entire extended family, which today consists of Darul Islam itself, JI, the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Laskar Jundulloh, the Banten group, and Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (AMIN), to name a few, not counting innumerable DI veterans who have their own large followings but operate completely outside any formal structure. These people know and visit each other, go to school together, intermarry, and keep in touch across generations. They also feud, bicker, and not infrequently, inform on each other. But the network endures, even as its component parts are constantly changing.
II. THE DEFEAT OF DARUL ISLAM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The Darul Islam movement began in 1948 with a regional rebellion in West Java under Soekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo, quickly followed by a similar outbreak in Central Java. Independently, other rebellions that also bore the name Darul Islam broke out in South Kalimantan (1950); South Sulawesi (1952) under Kahar Muzakkar, and Aceh (1953) under Daud Beureueh.

The rationales for the uprisings differed from place to place, but most were rooted in the unhappiness of local militias at concessions newly independent Indonesia had made to the Dutch or at its failure to accord due recognition to local guerrillas in the new national army. Religious factors were not paramount, but Islam became the common bond of the leaders, and by 1953, they had agreed to form a united front to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII).

Kartosoewirjo became NII's first imam. The rebellion itself was divided into seven regional commands (komando wilayah, KW):

- KW1: Priangan Timur (centred in Tasikmalaya but encompassing Jakarta, Purwakarta, and Cirebon);
- KW 2: Central Java;
- KW 3: East Java;
- KW 4: South Sulawesi and environs;
- KW 5: Sumatra;
- KW 6: Kalimantan; and
- KW7: Serang-Banten, Bogor, Garut, Sumedang, and Bandung.

Only in the mid-1970s would two other commands be added, KW8 for Lampung, and KW9 for the greater Jakarta metropolitan area.

On 1 August 1962, after Kartosoewirjo was captured, the Indonesian army persuaded 32 of his top lieutenants to pledge allegiance to the government in exchange for amnesty. In a statement known as Ikrar Bersama (Joint Proclamation), they acknowledged that the DI/NII movement had been wrong and misguided, and they had sinned against the people of West Java. They then affirmed their loyalty to the republic. The signers included Adah Djaelani Tirtapraja, Ateng Djaelani, Ules Sudjai, Djaja Sujadi Wijaya, Danu Muhammad Hassan, Zenaal Abidin, Toha Mahfud, Dodo Mohamad Darda, and others, many of whom would be arrested in the late 1970s for involvement in Komando Jihad.

The fact that so many top figures signed the loyalty oath complicated the question of succession after Kartosoewirjo was executed in September 1962. As all-Indonesia military commander (Komandemen Perang Seluruh Indonesia, KPSI), he had no second-in-command. A DI regulation decreed that any successor to the KPSI should be chosen from among regional commanders and members of the High Command but gave no directions for how this was to happen.

All six possible contenders had some shortcoming. Two West Java commanders, Djadja Sudjadi of Garut and Adah Djaelani of Tasikmalaya, and the commander for Java-Madura, Agus Abdullah Sukunsari of Majalengka, had signed the Joint Proclamation. Abdul Fatah Wirananggapti, of Kuningan, had been in prison since 1953 (he was only released in 1965 to help fight the Indonesian Communist Party). Kahar Muzakkar, the commander for Sulawesi, was unacceptable because of his efforts in 1962 to form a federation called the United Islamic Republic of Indonesia (Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia, RPPI) that explicitly rejected Kartosoewirjo's proclamation of a unitary Islamic state. Daud Beureueh of Aceh had surrendered in May 1962.

Effectively, DI became leaderless for a decade. Many signers of the proclamation received short-term benefits to shore up their loyalty, such as cars, land, and in one case, a kerosene distribution business.

"Between 1962 and 1968", wrote a leader, "the Islamic State of Indonesia was buried by the worldly facilities that the enemy provided".

But not everyone was co-opted. Ahmad Sobari, the DI bupati (district head) of Priangan Timur, around the West Javanese town of Tasikmalaya, was not about to abandon the struggle and in 1969 founded the Islamic State of Tejamaya (Negara Islam Tejamaya, NIT, Tejamaya being the area around Tasikmalaya). But...
Sobari himself was arrested in 1978, and the NIT never became influential though it still exists as a movement with a handful of members in the Tasikmalaya area.

As the leaders bickered, the rank-and-file -- and there were many -- were left rudderless. The best estimates for West Java and South Sulawesi are that at the height of the rebellions in 1956-1957, each had about 12,000 to 15,000 fighters. Many were available to be recruited again.9

The links of some of the West Java DI leaders with the army were reinforced in 1965-1966 when they were offered weapons in exchange for help in attacking suspected communists (PKI) in West Java, Aceh, and North Sumatra.8 Danu Muhammad Hassan reportedly even believed that a soon-to-be-notorious officer, Ali Moertopo, saved the DI leadership from annihilation in 1966 by intervening with Soeharto when he thought the latter intended to use the cover of the mass killings that year to wipe out other political enemies, including Darul Islam.9

The DI leaders saw tactical cooperation with the army to eradicate the PKI as both desirable in itself and a way of avoiding further arrests. But even as it took place, DI leaders continued to discuss the leadership vacuum and the need to consolidate the movement for an Islamic state. A few brave souls made their own efforts at consolidation. A former DI regiment commander, Opa Mustopa, tried and failed to pull the organisation together in 1967 in Rajapolah, Tasikmalaya. He was arrested and spent the next three years in prison.10

By the late 1960s, the Acehnese leader Daud Beureueh had become a strong contender for imam. Kartosowirjo and Kahar Muzakkar were both dead. Daud Beureueh was one of the original leaders of DI and a man who retained immense authority in Aceh. Sometime in 1967, he sent an envoy to West Java to sound out DI leaders about reuniting the movement. The response was to send two delegates, Djaja Sujadi and Kadar Solihat, to Aceh to ask Daud Beureueh to lead DI.11 He reportedly responded that it was up to the ummat [the Muslim faithful] to choose their imam, but that he was willing to be military commander (KPSI).12 A steady stream of DI notables headed up to Aceh thereafter, including Aceng Kurnia, and Haji Ismail Pranoto (Hispran) from Java, and Ale A.T., one of Kahar Muzakkar's men, from South Sulawesi.13

A. ACENG KURNIA AND THE PRTI

By the late 1960s it was as though DI began to emerge from a long hibernation. Aceng Kurnia began to instruct the children of DI members in his home area of Cibuntu, Bandung, among them Kartosowirjo's son Tahmid Rahmat Basuki, inspiring them to join DI and continue the struggle. One young man to come under his influence at this time was Abdullah Said, a Bugis admirer of Kahar Mazakkar who founded Pesantren Hidayatullah outside Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, a school that was later to support and shelter jihadists fighting in Ambon and Central Sulawesi.

But at this time in West Java, potential recruits saw Darul Islam not just as the embodiment of an Islamic state but also as the fulfilment of a prophecy called wangsit Siliwangi. According to this prophecy, the land of Pasundan (West Java today) will be great when it is led by followers of Kian Santang, the son of the 15th

10 http://www.geocities.com/darulislam/1962_1981.htm, confirmed by Crisis Group interviews. (Note that the website uses a numeral 1 rather than I for the first letter of Islam.)
13 Another version has it that Daud Beureueh took the initiative in 1968, perhaps after visits from the West Java leaders, to consolidate the movement, including by sending Gaos Taufik to Sulawesi. Crisis Group interview, March 2003.
century Sundanese king, Prabu Siliwangi. Legend has it that the Prophet's nephew, Ali bin Abi Thalib, brought Islam to Pasundan, and Kian Santang was one of his first converts (chronological discrepancies notwithstanding). At their first meeting, Ali thrust a staff into the ground and asked Kian Santang, who was known to have mystical powers that gave him superhuman strength, to pull it out. Kian Santang could not make it budge. Ali then recited a verse from the Quran and easily pulled out the staff. This convinced Kian Santang to become a Muslim, whereupon he took the name of Sunan Rahmat. In their efforts to recruit members, some DI leaders in the Tasikmalaya area would use this prophecy to convince villagers that they were the followers of Sunan Rahmat and were therefore destined for power.

About ten of Aceng Kurnia's protégés in the Bandung area, under the leadership of Tahmid, formed a new organisation in 1968 or 1969 called Penggerakan Rumah Tangga Islam (PRTI). Their goal was to consolidate and reactivate the DI leadership but they failed. An activist noted:

The problem was this: if we went to a squad leader, he'd say he didn't have orders from the platoon commander. The platoon commander would say he hadn't received any order from the company commander. The company commander wouldn't act in the absence of an order from the regiment commander. We finally realised that if we were to get anything moving, we'd have to start at the top.15

Eventually, Aceng Kurnia, working with the PRTI activists, formed a committee to bring about a reunion of former DI regional commanders. The problem was funding transport and accommodation. Danu Muhamad Hassan, who by then was already working for the state funding transport and accommodation, and Kian Santang was one of his first converts (chronological discrepancies notwithstanding). At their first meeting, Ali thrust a staff into the ground and asked Kian Santang, who was known to have mystical powers that gave him superhuman strength, to pull it out. Kian Santang could not make it budge. Ali then recited a verse from the Quran and easily pulled out the staff. This convinced Kian Santang to become a Muslim, whereupon he took the name of Sunan Rahmat. In their efforts to recruit members, some DI leaders in the Tasikmalaya area would use this prophecy to convince villagers that they were the followers of Sunan Rahmat and were therefore destined for power.

The Bandung meeting spawned a series of "secret" meetings, usually hosted by either Danu or Aceng Kurnia, to revive Darul Islam. They were secret in that not everyone in the DI leadership was aware of them -- but BAKIN was fully informed, thanks to Danu's participation.

The idea of working with DI leaders was very much the brainchild of Ali Moertopo, President Soeharto's intelligence adviser and head of Special Operations (Opsus). Moertopo had fought with some of these men, including Danu, in Hizbullah, the nationalist Muslim militia set up on Java in 1944 during the Japanese occupation. They not only trusted him but reportedly believed he was committed to the establishment of an Islamic state.20

On 21 April 1971, thanks to BAKIN, a reunion of some of the old DI leadership took place in Danu's home in Situaksan, Bandung. Over three days and three nights, according to a participant, some 3,000 people passed through the house, under a banner that read "Silaturrahmi ex-NII". BAKIN officials were among those who gave welcoming speeches: Col. Pitut Soeharto, for example, took the podium to explain why NII members should support Golkar.

Behind the formal speeches, a quiet process of internal consolidation was taking place, as DI leaders who had not seen one another for years sat down to discuss the future. One fault line that immediately emerged was over BAKIN support. Djaja Sudjadi and Kadar Solihat were very much opposed; many others saw nothing wrong with taking the money.

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14 There was some disagreement among the founders interviewed as to the date. The members included Maman Tsani, Sambas Suryana, Ir.Ageng, Ubad, Budiarto, Nanang, Ridwan, and Ayep, the younger brother of Aceng Kurnia's wife. See also http://www.geocities.com/darulislam/1962_1981.htm.
16 All figures denoted in dollars ($) refer to U.S. dollars.
17 At the trial of DI leader Haji Ismail Pranoto (Hispran) in Surabaya in 1978, prosecutors mentioned another meeting of ex-DI leaders in 1971 in the Utan Kayu area of Rawamangun, East Jakarta. Hispran said it was just to talk about the fate of children of former DI leaders and to seek funding from Danu Muhamad Hassan for a school. See "H. Ismail Bantah Akan Hidupkan NII", Pikiran Rakyat, 17 April 1978.
18 "Silaturrahmi" refers to a tradition of paying social visits within the Muslim community.
By 1973, at a meeting in Cibuntu, Danu, Aceng Kurnia and Adah Djaelani had drafted a new structure for the DI command, with Daud Beureueh as the top military commander.

B. THE MAHONI MEETING

In 1974, the leaders of the three core regions of DI -- Aceh, Java, and South Sulawesi -- met in a house on Jalan Mahoni in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta. The Mahoni meeting, as it became known, was a watershed because it signalled the success of efforts over the past five years to revive and unify the movement.

Daud Beureueh came from Aceh. Ale A.T. came from Makassar bearing an apology for the actions of those in South Sulawesi who, in 1962, renounced the 1949 declaration of an Islamic State of Indonesia and proclaimed the Islamic Republic of Sulawesi, thus splitting from their DI colleagues. This was blamed on the poor communications of the time, and the apology was accepted.21

The Mahoni meeting established a simple structure:

- Daud Beureueh as imam and KPSI;
- Gaos Taufik, a Sundanese living in North Sumatra, as military commander;
- Daud Beureueh and Ale A.T. from Sulawesi as sharing the foreign affairs portfolio;
- Adah Djaelani, assisted by Aceng Kurnia and Dodo Mohamad Darda alias Abu Darda (another of Kartosoewirjo's sons), as minister for home affairs; and
- Danu Muhamad Hassan as military commander for West Java.

Collectively, the leaders constituted the membership of the Imamate Council (Dewan Imamah), headed by Daud Beureueh. DI was divided into three major territorial commands: Java-Madura, under Danu Muhamad Hassan; Sumatra, including Aceh, under Gaos Taufik; and Sulawesi and eastern Indonesia, under Ale A.T. There was a commitment among those present to continue to work for an Islamic state but Daud Beureueh cautioned that they needed to focus on diplomacy and consolidation before they returned to confrontation.22

After twelve years in the wilderness, Darul Islam was back in business.

C. RELEVANCE FOR TODAY

In this early period of Darul Islam, several elements emerged that have carried through to the thinking and tactics of JI and like-minded groups in Indonesia. The first and most important, of course, is the mystique of an Islamic state. Kartosoewirjo, Kahar Muzakkar, and Daud Beureueh did not just talk about a state -- they fought for one and to this day remain heroes to all Indonesians who have fought for Islamic law. While some of the men around them have lost credibility, either for deviant religious beliefs or for selling out to the government, many still continue to inspire new generations of radicals. Ale A.T., for example, is said to have been a mentor to Agus Dwikarna. Gaos Taufik at 74 retains the respect of the extended DI family, despite regular contact with Indonesian intelligence, and continues to exert his charisma on young recruits. Many JI members still maintain contacts with the DI fighters of this generation.

A second element has to do with tactics. It was the DI commanders in West Java in this early period who legitimised the use of fa'i -- robbing non-believers as a way of raising funds for jihad, a practice adopted by virtually all DI offshoots and splinters, including JI. The reliance on fa'i meant that from the beginning in Indonesia there has been a symbiotic relationship between petty criminals and thugs on the one hand, and mujahidin on the other. The latter get badly needed resources, the former can repent and be absolved of sins while using their skills to commit the same kind of crimes for a new purpose. Fa'i has become a standard part of the JI fund-raising repertoire.

A third element has to do with the concept of a secure area where Islamic law can be fully applied. In the 1950s, DI commanders divided the regions where they were fighting into D1, D2, and D3. D1 covered areas in which they were in full control and could set up the administration of an Islamic state; those areas also became places of refuge for supporters fleeing less secure areas. D2 covered areas which were not fully under control but where the hold-outs could be brought in through dakwah (religious outreach and preaching), which became an important tactic for consolidating military gains. D3 referred to areas that could only be

21 Confidential DI document obtained by Crisis Group, February 2000. Republik Persatuan Sulawesi (RPS) and the United Islamic Republic of Indonesia (Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia, RPII) were both proclaimed in 1962 by members of Kahar Muzakkar's inner circle, and both represented breaks with West Java.

conquered through military force. As late as 2000, some DI leaders were still talking of the need to establish a DI area where the ummat could uphold Islamic law and the faithful under pressure from the enemy could find protection. This concept carried over into JI doctrine but was called the qoidah aminah (secure base). Until 2003 when several JI leaders in the area were arrested, many hoped Poso would serve that purpose.23

Finally, it was DI-West Java that left the legacy to new generations of the tripartite doctrine of iman (faith), hijrah (emigration or flight), and jihad (holy war). Iman remains the core of the movement. If political or military pressure on the faithful is too great, they should follow the example of the Prophet and move from their home area to a safer place, where they can build up their strength to return and wage jihad on the enemy. Malaysia became a place of hijrah for Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in the mid-1980s; Jakarta played that role around the same time for members of Islamic study groups in Central Java, who became the target of a government crackdown. And Mindanao, among other places, serves that function for JI today. Understanding the concept of hijrah, the importance of moving to a safer area, then waiting and consolidating there until it is possible to continue the war, is of fundamental importance for understanding present-day jihadist activities.

III. KOMANDO JIHAD

In 1976, a new violent phase of the DI movement began with the formation of Komando Jihad, an organisation Crisis Group described in August 2002 as the "creation of Ali Moertopo". Information made available after that report was published suggests that while Moertopo and some officials in BAKIN encouraged formation of Komando Jihad and certainly used it for their ends, DI leaders were not simply the gullible victims of a New Order plot. They actively participated in Komando Jihad's creation and saw it as the first real opportunity since the defeat of the 1960s to mount a guerrilla war against the Indonesian government.

One source says that the former head of BAKIN, Sutopo Yuwono, repeatedly warned Moertopo against getting too close to DI leaders, precisely because they could use the relationship for their own purposes. But Moertopo was apparently intent on encouraging them to act, because it would be easier to crush the forces of Islamic extremism if they were out in the open.24

A. THE LEAD-UP TO MILITARY ACTION

After the Mahoni meeting, the DI military structure was further refined. Java was divided into three divisions.25 At the same time, two new men, Ateng Djaelani Setiawan and Zaenal Abidin, were taken on to the Imamate Council, apparently at Danu Muhammad Hassan's initiative. Members of DI-Central Java protested: the two not only had surrendered to the military in 1961, before the final defeat, but had also taken part in a military dragnet operation to hunt for other DI fighters.

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24 Cahyono, op.cit, p. 195. According to the late General Soemitro, head of Indonesia's internal security agency at the time, the DI leaders believed that Ali Moertopo wanted to be vice president. If he succeeded, they would help him "neutralise" Soeharto, thereby elevating him to the presidency, and he would then support their goals.
25 The divisions were as follows: Division I, West Java: Commander I, Aceng Kurnia; Commander II, Ules Sudjai; Commander III, Mia Ibrahim, covering Priangan Timur; Commander IV, Uci Nong, covering Banten and Bogor. Division II, Central Java: Commander I, Saiful Imam, for the south; Commander II, Sutiko Abdurahman for the Surakarta area; Commander III, Haji Faleh, for the west (Kudus); Commander IV, Seno alias Basyar alias Abdul Hakim for the Semarang area. Division III, Commander I, Hasan; Commander II, Idris; Commander III, for the area of Blitar, not immediately filled.
In their defence, Danu said, "Everyone makes mistakes and has to atone for those errors. If someone has betrayed the jihad, the best form of atonement is to wage a jihad". This view of how to atone for past sins prevails to this day: it explains why feuds within the militant faction of the movement only rarely lead to expulsion or murder, and gives a clue to how the movement can split, regroup, and split again. Few reconciliations are permanent, but few breaks are final -- as long as there is a jihad to fight.

This case did produce one of the few lasting fault lines in DI, however. The men who objected to taking on the two new members with a dubious past were also those who had objected to BAKIN funding, and they decided to part company with the rest of the organisation. Accordingly, some time in 1975, in the subdistrict of Limbangan, Garut, Djaja Sudjadi, Kadar Solihat, and a number of other dissidents announced formation of a non-violent wing of Darul Islam, known as fillah (with God) as opposed to fisabilillah (following the path of God for jihad). Henceforth, the fillah wing would devote itself to education and social welfare activities, while the fisabilillah wing geared up for military action.

The decision to form Komando Jihad came out of a meeting in early 1976 between Gaos Taufik and Danu Mohamed Hassan to launch the revolution. The idea was apparently that it would begin in Sumatra, "like lighting a match", then sweep through West Java. It was left to Gaos Taufik to plan the military campaign.

Gaos Taufik's own background is relevant here. Born in Garut in 1930, he joined Hizbullah, the Muslim militia, in 1947. Later that year, he joined PADI (Pasukan Darul Islam). In 1954 he was captured by the army in Sukabumi, West Java, and forcibly relocated two years later to Rantau Perapat, North Sumatra, with some 1,500 other detainees. There he began to organise the local ulama, some of his fellow transmigrants and even some Indonesian soldiers into an anti-Sukarno resistance. By 1958 he had formed a 350-man corps, Operasi Sabang-Merauke, that started with no weapons and yet, according to DI lore, succeeded for four days in March 1958 in controlling the city of Medan. 

When defeat by the army seemed certain, Gaos withdrew and turned his troops over to Daud Beureueh. His military prowess, even for such a fleeting moment, gave him immense prestige, however, and he was unusual in having experience in both West Java and Sumatra.

Gaos's first step in launching Komando Jihad (Komji) was to hold a strategy meeting in Sukabumi in early 1976, where a flag was designed -- a single sword on a black background with "There is no God but Allah" in Arabic underneath. It was at this meeting that he decided to create a special forces unit for the campaign.

He then began to recruit both men he had known going back to the early 1950s as well as those who only came into the DI circle in Medan in the 1970s. The latter was a 24-year-old ustaz (religious teacher) from outside Larantuka, Flores, named Abdullah Umar. Executed by firing squad in 1989, Abdullah Umar not only became an important figure in Komando Jihad and in Darul Islam -- it was he who inducted the man who became head of JI's Mantiqi II, Abdullah Anshori alias Ibnu Thoyib alias Abu Fatih, into DI -- but he apparently introduced DI to his village in Flores. This produced a number of followers from an unlikely corner of the country who are still active today.

Komando Jihad operations started simultaneously in the provinces of North, South, and West Sumatra and Lampung. In North Sumatra, the first attack came in May 1976, a grenade that did not explode thrown into a state-sponsored Quran-reading contest in the town of Pematang Siantar, North Sumatra. This was followed by bombs in October 1976 at the Immanuel Baptist Hospital in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, and the Nurul Iman mosque in Padang. These operations caused no serious casualties and were undertaken by followers of Timsar Zubil, 26, who was then first assistant to the DI commander for North Sumatra, Agus Sulaiman Lubis. After several other bombings in Medan, including of the Apollo Bar, the Riang movie theatre, and a Methodist

27 The takeover of Medan is in fact a much more complicated story. It took place during the short-lived rebellion centered in West Sumatra in 1958 that proclaimed the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or PRRI). The leaders of PRRI had no DI background, but Operasi Sabang-Merauke is one of several instances of DI-PRRI cooperation against a common enemy.
28 One of the old guard was Imam Baharuddin, who was inducted into DI in 1951. According to prosecutors in Timsar Zubil's trial, Gaos Taufik assigned him to contact former DI members in North Sumatra, and he was then sent to Palembang in South Sumatra to inform ex-DI members there about the new command. "Bekas DI/TII Sumatera Bentuk Suatu Komando", Pikiran Rakyat, 26 January 1978
29 Sleman District Court, Berkas Perkara Tersangka Abdullah Umar, February 1983.
30 In their view, mosques were legitimate targets if they had been built on top of sinful premises or were being used to divide the ummat. Such mosques are known as masjid dhiror.
church, Timsar and others, including Gaos Taufik, were arrested.\(^{31}\)

At his trial in 1978, several witnesses testified that before the attacks, Timsar had taken part in a bomb-making class with some ten others in a house on Jl. Kalibaru in the Tanjung Priok port area of Jakarta in 1976. The house belonged to an ex-DI fighter from South Sulawesi named Jabir, who had married DI leader Aceng Kurnia's daughter. Around the same time, according to the prosecutor, another DI member, Rifai Ahmad, was sent to Kuala Lumpur to ask the Libyan embassy for arms. Rifai reported the Libyans had agreed and the arms would be dropped by plane along the Sumatra coast. Every day thereafter, DI men would go to the coast with binoculars waiting but the plane never came.\(^{32}\)

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Timsar was tried and sentenced to death in 1979 but the sentence was commuted to life and he was released in 1999. In an interview in 2001, he said that he and his men had used six grenades left over from the 1958 PRRI rebellion in Sumatra and a few kilograms of TNT from Lampung. He said the aim had been to weaken military control of Soeharto's New Order government through the application of "shock therapy." He said he realised after he was imprisoned that it had been wrong to attack places of worship and that what he had done was not in accordance with religious norms. In 1982 (while he was still officially detained), he visited the Nurul Iman mosque in Padang and the two churches in Medan and apologised for his actions.\(^{33}\)

After Timsar's arrest, Abdullah Umar fled to Pondok Ngruki. He had left Medan in 1976 to return his family to Flores. He tried to go back later in the year, only to be stopped at a checkpoint outside Palembang, South Sumatra where his two travelling companions were arrested, apparently in connection with Komando Jihad activities. He quickly returned to Flores and was still there as the community prepared for the 1977 elections. After reading newspaper reports about the arrests of Timsar Zubil and others in Medan, he decided it would be prudent to leave since he might be on a wanted list. He was taken in at Pondok Ngruki because he and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, as well as several other Ngruki teachers, had the same alma mater -- Gontor Pesantren in East Java, a school known for its progressive teaching.\(^{34}\)

**B. THE EMERGENCE OF MUSA WARMAN.**

In Lampung and Palembang, the star operative was Asep Warman alias Musa, a native of Garut, West Java, who had fought with DI in the early years, been arrested, and moved to Lampung after his release. He was active in DI's cell there, under the leadership of Pak Ujeng (sometimes seen as Ujo) and another man who continues to be active today, Abdul Qadir Baraja.\(^{35}\)

Baraja reportedly headed the Palembang operations of Komando Jihad in 1977, designed to secure weapons for DI through raids on police stations. The field commander was one Sukri, who commanded ten men. He was finally arrested and imprisoned in Lampung, where he led a mutiny that resulted in the release of all the prisoners. Most were recaptured but the exploit added to the reputation of the Lampung group.

Warman, whom colleagues described as a brilliant strategist, pulled together other Lampung-based militants and embarked on raids to acquire funds and weapons. DI sources claim he carried out sixteen such raids across southern Sumatra before Gaos Taufik's arrest prompted him to flee to Jakarta in 1978 with other Lampung fighters.

There they were given shelter in a pesantren called Misi Islam in the Tanjung Priok area of Jakarta. The head of the pesantren was Abdullah Hanafi -- a DI man known for idiosyncratic interpretations of Islam whose son, Hasyim, has become a key aide to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and arranges appointments for those who wish to visit him in prison. Another product of Misi Islam was Abu Dzar, Omar al-Faruk's father-in-law.

West Java was supposed to be the next theatre of the DI operation but it failed to erupt, even though a local DI leader, Mang Aslah, had recruited and trained a

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\(^{34}\) Gontor also produced four of Indonesia's top Muslim leaders today: the intellectual Nurchohish Madjid, the quintessential moderate thinker; Din Syamsuddin, Muhammadiyah leader, politician, and secretary of the Indonesian Council of Ulama; Hasyim Muzadi, leader of Nahdlatul Ulama and Megawati's running mate in 2004; and Hidayat Nur Wahid, head of the Muslim political party PKS.

\(^{35}\) Crisis Group interview, November 2003
group of men. They would not begin to act until 1979, inspired by Warman's success in fa'i robberies.\(^{36}\)

In the meantime, Warman and his associates, still reeling from the arrest of Gaos Taufik, decided that Ali Moertopo had been behind it and were determined to kill him. They learned he would be attending an event in Semarang, Central Java in December 1978 and moved from Misi Islam to prepare for the hit. For whatever reason, the plan failed but Warman stayed on.

From January 1979, he and Abdullah Umar joined forces and together with DI leaders from Central Java, launched attacks that became known as "Terror Warman". They first killed the assistant rector of a university who reportedly gave police information that led to the arrest of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Then, still in January 1979, they killed another man whose information they suspected of having led to the arrest of Abdul Qadir Baraja and a special forces member, Farid Ghozali. In March, they carried out a fa'i robbery of the State Islamic Institute in Yogyakarta and attempted the same a few weeks later in Malang, East Java, holding up the vehicle delivering salary money for the State Teacher Training Institute.\(^{37}\)

The income from the robberies conducted by Warman and the West Java team was so high that the DI leadership decided to incorporate these special forces into the regular DI structure.\(^{38}\) In June 1979, they were brought under the DI's Java-Madura command, then headed by Ules Sudjai, only to be transferred later to KW 7, the DI regional command covering Garut and Banten.\(^{39}\)

Abdullah Umar and Warman were caught in April 1979. Warman escaped and for two years burnished his reputation by becoming DI's main fund-raiser through fa'i raids. He even undertook contract raids to secure consumer goods such as colour television sets for the DI leadership. He was finally tracked down and killed by the army on 23 July 1981 in Soreang Kolot, Bandung.\(^{40}\)

The DI leadership was eager to ensure that fa'i income would continue, so it fell to Abdullah Sungkar to find a replacement. He turned to thugs recruited by his followers in the Condet area of Jakarta.

In the meantime, the leadership question arose again. On 1 May 1978, the Indonesian military had abducted Daud Beureueh and secretly taken him to Jakarta where he surfaced, under house arrest. He clearly was unable to act as imam, let alone KPSI. The leadership seemed to be in limbo again. During that same year, rivalry between the fillah-fisabilillah factions reached new heights when Adah Djaelani ordered two of his underlings to kill Djaja Sudjadi and some of his followers.

### C. Relevance for Today

Komando Jihad, as an episode in DI history, is important for several reasons. The influence of some of those involved continues to be felt:

- Abdullah Umar is dead but his nephew, Abu Bakar, continues to preach at a DI-linked mosque behind Sarinah Department store in Jakarta. Some of the regular attendees, including Ahmad Said Maulana, became new recruits to the movement after the violence in Ambon erupted.

- Emeng Abdurahman, from Warman's special forces unit, remains active in Bandung as the imam for the DI faction loyal to the late Abdul Fatah Wirananggapati.

- Abdul Qadir Baraja, imprisoned first for Komando Jihad activities, then for having provided the bombs for a series of explosives in 1985, now runs his own organisation working to re-establish the caliphate. Khilafatul Muslimin is based in Lampung and Sumbawa (where Baraja is from), but Baraja lectures regularly in Bekasi, and several JI members

36 Among those trained by Mang Aslah (killed by a grenade backfiring), were Amir (Garut), Empon (Tasikmalaya), Dudu (Garut), Iyus (Garut), Itang (Garut), Bana (Ciwidey), and Emeng Abdurahman (Bandung), now imam of DI faction once led by the late Abdul Fatah Wirananggapati. They were responsible for the robbery of a gold store called "Sinar Jaya" in Tasikmalaya on 9 April 1979; the robbery of a savings and loan cooperative in Sikijang subdistrict, Majalengka, April 1980; robbery of salaries of the local education and culture office in Banjarsari subdistrict, Ciamis, 5 Mei 1980; and robbery of a gold store in Subang on 9 July 1980.


38 It often happened that top leaders only learned of the robberies through the newspapers. They would then call up the special forces and demand a share. Crisis Group interview, November 2004.

39 The fa'i proceeds also came under Ules Sudjai's control and perhaps inevitably, some DI leaders began to grumble about unfair distribution. Toha Mahfudz, then head of KW7, was particularly critical. Adah Djaelani as imam ordered that...

have reportedly joined his organisation. This is probably a positive development, since there is nothing to suggest that Khilafatul Mujahidin itself has been involved in violence, despite Baraja's past.

The exploits of Komando Jihad operatives have become the stuff of legend for a younger generation of DI. For example, how "Martyr" Warman escaped from prison has become a tale of heroism, passed on among DI families, inspiring children to follow in the footsteps of this unlikely role model. Warman is portrayed not as a man who stole television sets and robbed teachers of their wages but as a devout Muslim whose piety led him to acts of bravery against a much stronger enemy until he ultimately died for his faith.

The experience of Komando Jihad also shows that no matter how deeply Indonesian intelligence is able to infiltrate an organisation, there are those in the target group who are equally adept at using the intelligence organisations for their own purposes. One man suggested to Crisis Group that the very fact that intelligence had so many plants in the DI organisation made it blind to its real agenda, because it assumed the plants were working first and foremost for the government, rather than for themselves and the movement.

IV. POWER STRUGGLE IN JAVA

The period 1979 to 1987 was critical for DI. Adah Djaelani emerged as the new imam, just as the Soeharto government intensified a crackdown on the movement that led to the arrest of most of the Java-based leadership, including him. Abdullah Sungkar and Ajengan Masduki contended for leadership, with both drawing in new recruits through intensified dakwah programs, particularly in Jakarta from 1983 to 1987. The programs continued for several years after Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir fled to Malaysia in 1985. The same period saw the first Indonesians leave for the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to train as mujahidin. Many of the subsequent fissures within Darul Islam, including those that produced salafi jihadist groups, originated during this period.

A. ADAH DJAEELANI BECOMES IMAM

On 1 July 1979, in a meeting in Tangerang, outside Jakarta, attended by sixteen DI leaders, Adah Djaelani was chosen as imam in what other senior leaders later termed a bloodless coup. He reached the top position in DI through some extraordinarily manipulative tactics.

First, he had a key rival killed. The split between the non-violent fillah and the more militant fisabilillah factions had grown steadily worse since it first emerged in 1975. The fisabilillah wing saw the fillah faction as having abandoned jihad and therefore the NII movement more broadly, except it still had the gall not only to call themselves DI but to claim the imamate for its leader, Djaja Sudjadi.

In 1978, Adah, according to his supporters, sought a fatwa from Ajengan Masduki about the permissibility under Islamic law to have two imams. Ajengan Masduki, thinking he had been casually asked a hypothetical question, said that if there were two imams, one had to be false, and the penalty for that was death. He reportedly had no idea that Adah Djaelani was asking him to determine the fate of a fellow DI member. But Adah had Djaja shot and killed, together with several of his men, and the rupture between the two factions seemed irreparable.

41 In the 1970s and 1980s, the slogan changed slightly to "Live well (in the sense of correctly, according to Islam) or die a martyr", but the impact was the same.
had dual structures, fillah and fisabilillah: only the latter has produced jihadists.

Adah told the assembled members that Daud Beureueh, then under house arrest, had given him the mandate to become imam. He said that Gaos Taufik, in prison and unable to set the record straight, had given him a letter from Daud Beureueh to this effect. But after his release, Gaos Taufik said the letter he had passed to Adah Djaelani from Daud Beureueh was a copy of one appointing Gaos as military commander. It had nothing to do with Adah at all.45

After Adah's accession, the DI elite from West Java appeared to be firmly back in control, and several senior commanders under Kartosoewirjo were made members of the Imamate Council. In addition to Adah Djaelani, they included Aceng Kurnia, Ules Sudjai and Tahmid Kartosoewirjo. One non-West Java member was Achmad Hussein, from Kudus.

But Central and East Java had come to be far more prominent in DI. For one thing, some of the Central Javanese commanders who had fought with Kartosoewirjo returned to their own villages after the defeat in 1962. For another, the Mahoni meeting appears to have led to an intensive drive for new recruits, much of which was in Central and East Java. Achmad Hussein, from Kudus, Central Java, and Hispran from Surabaya, for example, formally inducted Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar into DI in 1976. At his trial in 1978, Hispran, who was originally from Brebes, Central Java, was accused of recruiting all over East Java, including in Bojonegoro, Nganjuk, Sidoarjo, and Lamongan -- home of the Bali bombers, Amrozi, Muchlas, and Ali Imron.46 He was arrested in January 1977 while inducting several new members in Blitar.

Adah Djaelani as imam retained the existing three regional commands. Gaos Taufik (even though he was in prison) and Ale A.T. were kept as heads respectively of Sumatra and Sulawesi plus eastern Indonesia. Ules Sudjai replaced Danu Muhamad Hassan as head of the Java-Madura command.

The existing sub-commands were also retained, with two more added in the mid-1970s: KW8, covering Lampung, with Abdul Qadir Baraja in charge, and KW9 for greater metropolitan Jakarta.47

But Adah Djaelani was only briefly in power before he and the rest of the DI leadership were arrested and charged with involvement in Komando Jihad.

B. RELEVANCE FOR TODAY

Several key figures from the 1979 DI leadership structure have direct links to JI. Haji Rais, who took part in the meeting that selected Adah Djaelani as imam, is the grandfather of Abdul Rauf alias Sam, one of the young men from the Banten group involved in the pre-Bali bombing gold store robbery at the instigation of Imam Samudra.

Haji Faleh from Kudus, the leader of KW2 during this period, was the father of Abu Rusdan alias Thoriquddin, the man who succeeded Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as amir of JI, at least in a caretaker role. Abu Rusdan himself was inducted into DI at the age of fifteen by Aceng Kurnia. Muhamad Zainuri, the father of Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, the Afghanistan veteran killed in Mindanao in 2003 after escaping from a Manila prison, appears to have become a member of DI during this period and was arrested in the government crackdown on Komando Jihad.

In December 2003, after police raids in July netted a wealth of JI ammunition and documents, Taufik Ahmad, son of DI leader Achmad Hussein, was arrested in Kudus. He was accused of working with Abu Rusdan but there was insufficient evidence to hold him, and he was released after a few days. It was another example of a younger DI generation closely associated with, if not a member of, DI's jihadist offshoot.

Another lesson may be that despite a serious power struggle, including the murder of an important contender and a deep rift between the fillah and fisabilillah factions, the organisation did not collapse. If JI splits, and it may well, both factions could survive, but the more militant wing would be the source of ongoing problems and the potential progenitor of equally militant offspring.

47 KW9 would become notorious in DI circles for the deviant teaching of Panji Gumilang alias Abu Toto, the founder and head of al-Zaytun pesantren in Indramayu. It split into two in 1996. See Section VII, below.
V. USROH AND THE REJUVENATION OF DARUL ISLAM

It was the DI offshoots in Jakarta and elsewhere in Java in the mid-1980s, however, that produced an explosion of jihadists. The increase stemmed from a new recruiting technique, growing anger among Muslim activists at the Soeharto government, and the availability of training in Afghanistan.

A. THE ORIGINS OF USROH IN INDONESIA

The new recruitment method was called usroh (literally family), and had been pioneered by Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The idea was to gather ten to fifteen people prepared to live according to Islamic principles and Islamic law. Each usroh group would then become a building block for the eventual establishment of an Islamic state.

In Indonesia, the first proponents in 1977 were activists in the Coordinating Body of Indonesian Mosque Youth (Badan Koordinasi Pemuda Mesjid Indonesia, BKPMI) based at the Istiqomah Mosque in Bandung.48 BKPMI members fell into two large groups, DI and non-DI.49 The DI members looked to Aceng Kurnia as their mentor and tended to be members of either the Indonesian Islamic Students organisation (Pelajar Islam Indonesia, PII) or the Movement of Islamic Youth (Gerakan Pemuda Islam, GPI). Two BKMPI students had obtained a copy of al-Banna's manual in Arabic and translated it into Indonesian.50 This became the standard reference book.

From the Istiqomah Mosque in Bandung, the usroh concept spread to other mosques in Bandung, where it took particular root in the Salman Mosque of Bandung Institute of Technology, although its proponents there had no connection with Darul Islam.51 Mursalin Dahlan, a Bandung-based DI/PII member, introduced the idea to young DI members in Yogyakarta, including to three men who later became prominent figures in the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI): Irfan Awwas, his elder brother Fihiruddin alias Abu Jibril, and Muchliansyah. All were students of Abdullah Sungkar; with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, they began what was in effect a DI recruitment and training program using the usroh method.

If Yogyakarta learned about usroh from Bandung DI members, the latter adopted the idea of pesantren kilat (literally "express schools" but referring to intensive short-term religious study) from their Yogyakarta counterparts. The twin methods then spread from Yogyakarta and Bandung to Jakarta and East Java.52 One reason that the younger generation of DI found these methods so attractive was that DI had no recruitment system of its own. Not only did these new techniques offer a way of infusing new blood into the organisation at a time when most of the leadership was in prison, but they also entailed a more rigorous approach to Islam than most older DI members were familiar or comfortable with. Religious study sessions of this kind also provided a forum where resentment against the Soeharto government could be aired, at a time when the New Order's determination to crush political Islam was increasing.

They proved to be so popular that the young DI activists decided there needed to be some standardisation, first in structure, then in content. In 1980 they formed the Body for Indonesian Muslim Development (Badan Pembangunan Muslimin Indonesia, BPMI). It was based at Jl.Menteng Raya No.58, the headquarters of Gerakan Pemuda Islam.

With Nunung Nurul Ichsan from Jakarta as head and Mursalin Dahlan as secretary general, BPMI turned the pesantren kilat into three- or four-day courses aimed at young people, especially students. Participants could "graduate" and continue their studies in the usroh program, during which they would be inducted into DI. So many people were drawn in that a BPMI member recalled, "Almost every day, induction programs were taking up our entire schedules".53

48 The usroh idea was reportedly brought to Indonesia from Malaysia by Toto Tasmana, a BKPMI member who was much impressed with how his Malaysian counterparts were applying it. Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, November 2004.
49 The non-DI members numbered several who became well-known moderate Muslim intellectuals, including Syafi'i Anwar, director of the International Centre for Islam and Pluralism, and Jimly Asshiddiqie, Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court.
50 Usroh serta Pedoman Penyelenggaraan Grup Studi dan Diskusi Usroh [Usroh and a Guide for Implementing Usroh Study and Discussion Groups].
52 The key people involved in promotion of these methods were in Bandung, Mursalin Dahlan, Kurniawan; Rizal Fadillah, and Enceng Syarif Hidayatullah; in Jakarta, Nunung Nurul Ikhsan, Dudung, and Hasanudin Hajad; in Yogyakarta, Fihiruddin and Muchliansyah; and in Malang, Mochamad Achwan.
BPMI opened branches across Java. In February 1981, Mochamad Achwan, later to be arrested for involvement in church bombings in Malang on Christmas Eve 1984, was installed by Mursalin Dahlan as head of the Malang branch. During his trial in 1986, prosecutors charged that the Malang branch held regular meetings to discuss overthrow of the government and establishment of an Islamic state, but it clearly found a responsive audience -- by the end of the 1981, 93 people had been inducted in Malang alone after three pesantren kilat sessions.

By and large, the usroh movement operated outside the formal fisabilillah DI structure, and its relationship to that structure varied from place to place. In West and Central Java, there was close cooperation, particularly since Abdullah Sungkar was so prominent in the formal structure of DI-Central Java, and it was his students running the usroh groups there. In Jakarta, however, relations were strained, perhaps because KW9, the local regional command, was one of the few that did have a recruitment program, and the usroh activists competed for the same people. KW9 used the Jakarta Muballigh Corps (Korp Muballigh Jakarta) as the front for its recruiting activities.

KW9, however, also saw usroh as having abandoned the duly constituted DI leadership. Its members were loyal to Adah Djaelani; the Bandung-based usroh leaders preferred Aceng Kurnia. There were religious differences as well. The usroh leadership generally followed the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many members of KW9 were influenced by the teachings of Isa Bugis, whose ideas were anathema to those of a more purist persuasion.

But whether the older members liked it or not, the usroh movement transformed Darul Islam and gave it new energy and sense of purpose. To the young activists, expanding the usroh movement was not just a religious activity. It was a means toward the end of overthrowing the Soeharto government and establishing an Islamic state, and as the number of recruits increased, that goal seemed more reachable -- especially with the recent revolution in Iran as a backdrop.

B. IRAN AS A MODEL

Sometime in 1981, the DI usroh activists made contact with a group of dissidents, all members of the Jakarta political and military elite, known as "Petition of 50" after a petition they had sent to President Soeharto in 1980 demanding greater political freedom. Most of these wanted nothing to do with Darul Islam. But a few, including Ir. [Engineer] Sanusi, a former cabinet minister, began to meet regularly with Mursalin Dahlan and others to discuss the "elimination" of Soeharto.

For Mursalin, the Iranian revolution wasn't just an inspiration; it was almost a blueprint for how to take power. He set out a seven-stage plan:

- **Stage I:** In Iran, the revolution created "permanent complications" for the Shah to the point that he fled. In Indonesia, "permanent complications" would have to be created for Soeharto, but in this case, through killing him.
- **Stage II:** In Iran, Bazargan, then a minister, became president. In Indonesia, once Soeharto was gone, Vice President Adam Malik would succeed him.
- **Stage III:** In Iran, Imam Khomeini appeared. In Indonesia, a coalition of nationalists, military officers, and Muslims (NASABRI) would arise.
- **Stage IV:** In Iran, the masses took to the streets to support Khomeini. In Indonesia, the masses would turn out to support NASABRI.
- **Stage V:** In Iran, the security forces would be consolidated and purged. In Indonesia, a similar purge would take place.
- **Stage VI:** In Iran, Khomeini then took power. In Indonesia, democracy would flourish after a free and fair election.
- **Stage VII:** In Iran, an Islamic state was proclaimed. In Indonesia, Islamic parties would win the election and establish an Islamic state.

None of this could happen until Soeharto was gone, so Mursalin Dahlan and others began to plot his assassination. Some time around August 1982, he put together a special team that included a six-member hit

55 Ibid, p. 15.
56 Isa Bugis, originally from Pidie, Aceh, was active in Jakarta in the 1950s and 1960s. He called his movement "Reformist Ummat" (Ummat Pembaru) but it was more popularly known simply as the Isa Bugis Movement. His teachings were seen as politically suspect by the Ministry of Religion and as deviant by orthodox ulama. See "Jamaah Isa Bugis", Darul Islam, 12-26 June 2001, p. 93. The movement started in Sukabumi, then spread to Lampung, where it developed a separate community in Kotabumi, the DI stronghold. In Bandung, the movement was banned in 1968.

58 Crisis Group interview, November 2004, and notes based on a written document about the plan.
squad. The weapon of choice was a bomb. The team reportedly developed two plans, neither of which came to fruition. In one, they would hurl a bomb at Soeharto's car as he returned from golf in east Jakarta. In the second, they would plant a bomb at a railway crossing near the president's home.

In September 1982 at a meeting at the office of the newsletter ar-Risalah, Mursalin Dahlan, Sanusi, Muchlianyah, Fihiruddin alias Abu Jibril, Muhammed Achwan, and several others including Agung Riyadi, currently in custody in Malaysia on suspicion of JI membership, continued discussions about the assassination. They reportedly discussed intensifying training in pesantren kilats across Central and East Java, with the idea that the participants would eventually be brought to Jakarta to initiate mass action in the streets of the capital.

To facilitate this training and standardise the teaching materials, Mursalin and other usroh leaders established the Institute for Education and Development of Pesantren Kilat (Lembaga Pendidikan Pengembangan Pesantren Kilat, LP3K) in December 1982.

When they found they could not do either, they set their sights on the president's planned February 1983 visit to Central Java to officiate at a ceremony marking the restoration of Borobodur, the eighth century Buddhist temple outside Yogyakarta. This plan collapsed as well when the plotters could not find a way to hide explosives in Borobodur. By the end of 1983, the dream of revolution had faded, and a crackdown on usroh activists had begun in Central Java.

C. USROH TODAY

Many of the usroh leaders from this period continue to be politically active. Several who were arrested in Central Java and remained in custody throughout the rest of the 1980s became founding members of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), the organisation set up in 2000 to work for the application of Islamic law. Irfan Awwas, Shobbarin Syakur, Mochamad Achwan and Mahasin Zaini are examples. By virtue of their imprisonment, they missed the opportunity to go to Afghanistan and were therefore less likely to become JI than colleagues who fled to Jakarta to escape arrest and were there when the funds for Afghan training started coming. With much of the usroh leadership arrested, in hiding, or abroad by 1985-1986, the regular fisabilillah structure of DI had to decide what to do with the many young people who had been recruited. Gradually, most were quietly absorbed back into the DI regional commands, ending the dualism in the fisabilillah wing that usroh had generated.

60 Then edited by Irfan Awwas, now head of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI).
62 Ibid., p. 9.
VI. **USROH IN JAKARTA: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONDET GROUP**

Even before the crackdown in Central Java began, Abdullah Sungkar had sent several of his top cadres to work with the _usroh_ groups in Jakarta. Three came to play a key role in the radicalisation of DI. One was Ibnu Thoyib alias Abu Fathih, later to become head of Jemaah Islamiyah's Mantiqi II. The second was Muchliansyah alias Solihin, a man known for his fiery preaching who joined B'asyir and Sungkar in Malaysia in 1986 and managed to be always on the fringes of JI activities although not, as far as we know, a member. The third was Achmad Furzon alias Broto, also known as Ustdad Ahmad, a preacher and a loyal follower of DI leader Ajengan Masduki, who became instrumental in the recruitment of DI members for Afghanistan. The _usroh_ groups they established in Condet, East Jakarta and later in Pasar Santa, South Jakarta, drew in men who continue to be active in Jemaah Islamiyah and other jihadist groups to this day.

The network of groups in these two areas became known respectively as _Ring Condet_ and _Ring Santa_. "Ring" in DI parlance refers to a group established outside the command structure of the area in which it is based. Ring Condet and Ring Santa did not answer to the command of the KW9, the DI region that covered Jakarta, but to KW2 in Central Java, just as Ring Banten that later emerged was outside the structure of KW7, the region that covered Banten. Ring Condet consisted of high school students, wealthy contractors, vegetable sellers, and drivers, a real social mixture, although the members of individual _usroh_ groups tended to be more or less at the same socioeconomic level.

Ring Santa, consisted largely of gang members who joined as a way of protecting themselves from _petrus_ (pembunuhan misterius, mysterious killings), a government program for addressing crime in urban areas through extrajudicial execution of suspected criminals, whose bodies were left on the side of the road as lessons.63

Some hardline preachers from Tanjung Priok, the port area of Jakarta, also joined, as did students from Islamic schools in the areas where the meetings were held. A participant told ICG that student dormitories were top recruiting areas.64 Some students also came up from Pondok Ngruki in Solo to take part. The total number of participants was probably about 100.65

In 1986, _Ring Santa_ was shaken by an incident in which two of its thug members, including Muchliansyah's bodyguard, killed the driver of a main benefactor of the Jakarta _usroh_ movement in a dispute about a debt.66 This led to the exposure and break-up of the Santa group. The _usroh_ movement in Jakarta effectively split into three parts.

Some members joined Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in Malaysia. A second group, led by Broto in East Jakarta, continued to function as a DI cell network and began in 1986-1987 to recruit for Afghanistan. A third, led by former _Ring Santa_ member Nur Hidayat, regrouped in Ancol, North Jakarta, in 1987 and went on to attempt a DI uprising in Lampung. Members of all three groups later reappeared in various guises as jihadists.

A. **BROTO'S GROUP**

The careers of four men give some idea of how important this group is for understanding JI's subsequent history.

Slamet Widodo was arrested in Jakarta in 2003 for having been part of a JI special forces team planning to blow up buildings and foreign assets. Ahmad Sajuli is in detention in Malaysia under the Internal Security Act (ISA) for JI-related activities. Karsidi is in prison in Central Java for working with a Darul Islam member to sell army-issue ammunition for use in Ambon. Yoyok is a gang leader in Jakarta, who in 1999 became a founder of the AMIN organisation, some of whose members became involved in violence in Jakarta, Ambon, and Poso.

Karsidi and Yoyok were never JI members but stayed in touch with people who were. Their careers suggest that for anyone wishing to understand the broader network in which JI moves, it would be useful to look at the people active in Condet who did not go to Afghanistan, stayed loyal to Ajengan Masduki, and continued to play active roles in the _fisabilillah_ wing of DI.

Slamet Widodo alias Pepen alias Urwah. The testimony of Slamet Widodo, arrested in 2003 as a member of a new special forces unit being trained by Jemaah Islamiyah's Mantiqi II military unit, offers an interesting insight into Broto's group.

63 Gerakan Usroh, op.cit., pp. 48-49. Syukur cites a participant who took part with some 30 others in a training course shortly after the group in Pasar Santa was established, but it is not clear how many subsequent courses were held.

64 Crisis Group interview, March 2004.

65 Gerakan Usroh, op.cit., pp. 14-15; Gerakan Usroh, p. 70.
In 1984, when he was eighteen and still in high school in East Jakarta, Slamet joined an usroh group in Cempaka Putih, East Jakarta, that appears to have been part of Ring Condet. The group, mostly men in their mid-20s and fairly poor (one drove a bajaj, a three-wheeled, one-person taxi) was led by a man named Mubasir. Mubasir's younger brother and brother-in-law were also part of the group.

In 1987, after the Ring Santa debacle, Slamet joined another usroh group in Sumur Batu, Jakarta, this time led by a young man named Jamal, who was a student at the Muhammadiyah Technical College. During his interrogation sixteen years later, Slamet remembered the names of five others who frequently attended, including a few students and labourers, but also Broto, who was then, according to Slamet, about 35.

Slamet uses the terms usroh and pengajian NII (religious study meeting for the Indonesian Islamic State) interchangeably. It was while he was attending the Sumur Batu pengajian in 1989 that Broto offered Slamet the chance to go to Afghanistan, all expenses paid. Within a week, he had a passport, and the following week he was on his way via Malaysia.

He stayed two years, worked briefly in a repair shop in Pakistan, and then returned to Malaysia, where he got involved in construction of the Lukmanul Hakiem pesantren, the JI base in Johore. When he returned to Jakarta in 1993, he began trading in used electronic goods, a business he engaged in until his arrest. Sometime after his return, he began attending religious meetings in the Suprapto-Suparno Mosque, a JI gathering place in east Jakarta, but appears only to have become an active JI member in 2000. It means that after his return to Jakarta, while he may have had contact with fellow Afghan and Condet alumni, it was seven years before he was called up for the equivalent of return to active duty.

Ahmad Sajuli. Another JI member who began his career in Ring Condet and detained since 2001 in Malaysia under the ISA, Sajuli was a high school student in his early 20s in Kelapa Gading, North Jakarta, when he began to attend religious discussions in the Arief Rahman Hakiem Mosque of the University of Indonesia and the Solihin Mosque in Tanjung Priok. It was apparently through his contacts in these mosques that he met Broto, who, in 1984, invited him to take part in the Condet meetings. Sajuli said the discussions in Condet focused on Darul Islam, and how Kartosoewirjo had filled a political void when Soekarno lacked the necessary courage.

In 1985, I joined a pengajian that eventually called itself Darul Islam, under the leadership of Ahmad Furzon alias Broto, Mahmudi, and Aos Firdaus. They all lived in Tanjung Priok. Our study materials were all about the problem of the ummah; character (akhlak); and worship. We didn't talk about jihad in those days. We spent a lot of time talking about the wealth of government officials.

Everyone who became a member of Darul Islam had to be inducted and swear an oath beforehand. I was inducted by Ahmad Furzon alias Broto in his house….As I recall, there were eight members of Darul Islam there.

In 1986, I and thirteen others were ordered by Broto to go to Afghanistan. The others were Azam, Hasan Abdullah (Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's son-in-law), Firdaus, Abdul Salam, Lukman, Saiful, Jahe, Abdul Hadi, Hisbullah and Muso hạn….I returned to Indonesia in 1987. In 1988 or 1989, I was invited by Hasan Abdullah to move to Malaysia with my wife and child.

Karsidi alias Mansur alias Atang. Another member of the Condet group was Karsidi alias Mansur alias Atang Sutisna bin Sahidin. Now 42, he was reportedly close to the founders of Condet. He was also a distributor of ar-Risalah, edited by Irfan Awas Suryahardiy of MMI.

After the Condet group split up, Karsidi reportedly formed his own cell, although it is not clear who was in it or whether he considered it to be an active part of DI. He was reportedly involved in the founding of AMIN. Today he is in prison for a different offence. In what appears to have been a sting operation, police stopped a vehicle on 2 April 2003 in Banyumas, near the border of Central and West Java and found over 4,000 rounds of ammunition made by the military's munitions factory, PT Pindad, in Bandung -- as well as some Darul Islam literature.

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67 Many other Afghan alumni were also former members of Ring Condet.
68 Dewan Dakwah Islamicah Indonesia (Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia) had a strong influence on the Solihin Mosque, according to Sajuli.
Three men were arrested: Karsidi, whose residence at the time was Bekasi, outside Jakarta; Dadang Surachman alias Dadang Hafidz, 46, from Cicendo, Bandung; and Dadang's older brother, Endang Rukmana, from Cimahi, Bandung. The three were reportedly on their way to the bus terminal in Solo to sell the ammunition to someone who would send it to Ambon.

Dadang had been a member of an *usroh* group in Bandung. He was reportedly detained in Bandung for several months after the Lampung incident in 1989, where he became close to some of the DI notables imprisoned there, including Ajengan Kecil, Emeng Abdurrahman, and Dodo Kartosoewirjo, the DI founder's son, and eventually became active in Darul Islam's KW7. He is also known as the teacher of Abu Dujana, a JJ leader, who went to Afghanistan to train on his recommendation.

Dadang was known in radical circles as an arms dealer who used *oknum* (rogues) in the military to get access to PT Pindad stocks. The arrests suggest a circle that ties the Condet group, *usroh*, Darul Islam, violence in Ambon, and Jemaah Islamiyah together in an extended web of personal affiliations. If JJ leaders needed weapons, it is at least plausible that they would turn to Dadang to get them.

**Yoyok.** A gang leader from North Jakarta who joined the Condet group after meeting Broto, he has had perhaps the most interesting career trajectory of the lot. Yoyok needed protection from the *petrus* killings but was also impressed by Broto's religious knowledge. Broto trusted him and made him treasurer within DI's Jakarta structure, at the same level as Muchiansyah alias Solihin, whose credentials within the movement were far stronger.

In mid-1985, Broto offered Yoyok a chance to go to Afghanistan with the first "class", but he was marrying later that year and decided to stay behind and help with logistics. That decision was almost certainly what kept him on the Ajengan Masduki side of the split with Abdullah Sungkar several years later.

In 1998, Yoyok, on behalf of Ajengan Masduki, began sending people to Mindanao for training. Their recruits were some of the most militant DI members in Jakarta, including Achmad, Pikar (Zulfikar), Annas, Agus, and Asadullah.

Led by Asadullah and Yoyok, these men would form another Darul Islam splinter group, AMIN (Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara), in 1999 after the Ambon violence broke out. Yoyok never joined JJ; he remains a gang leader but stays in touch with his old associates.

### B. NUR HIDAYAT'S GROUP

In 1987, Nur Hidayat managed to bring together a number of the old Condet and Santa members in what became known as Ring Ancol, since most of the initial meetings took place in Ancol, north Jakarta.

Meetings would be held in different homes, involving eight or ten people, mostly men. The focus of discussion was both ideology and religion. In terms of the former, the discussion leader would explain the ideals and ideology of Darul Islam, particularly the tripartite concept of *imam-hijrah-jihad*. Attention would then turn to Quranic study, with one person reading a few verses of the Quran in Arabic, translating them, then asking each participant to recite them. The group would then discuss the meaning. At the end of the meeting, each person would have to recite the verses assigned for memorisation at the previous session. Those who had not memorised them would have to do push-ups or pay a small fine. The session would end around midnight, and the participants would sleep at the house, wake for prayers and *zikir* (recitation of the name of Allah) at 3 a.m., go back to sleep and get up again for morning prayers. Then they would disperse.

Members of Ring Ancol saw it as far more egalitarian than Ring Condet, with no imam and no hierarchy. But within six months, the Ancol group, too, had split, with one faction, led by Abdul Haris, wanting to focus more on *tarbiyah* (education) along Muslim Brotherhood lines, and Nur Hidayat deciding on a more militant course.

In mid-April 1988, the group around Nur Hidayat, including Fauzi Isman, Sudarsono (formerly head of BKPMI for East Java), Wahidin, and Zaenal Abidin, decided to use military means to force the application of Islamic law. They agreed to revive the *usroh* groups of Abdullah Sungkar, get in touch with former Darul Islam leaders and others with a similar vision, and recruit new members for a movement that would be stronger, more stable, and more operationally capable.

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72 Another Indonesian man named Dadang Surachman was a confidante of Hambali in Malaysia and a member of JJ there; this is a different person.
74 Crisis Group interview, January 2004. This is one of several examples of prison experience leading to induction into DI.
practical, and more efficient than any that had gone before.77

The story of the plans for setting up an "Islamic village" in Lampung in 1988-1989 and beginning a new uprising there -- plans that went tragically awry -- has been well told elsewhere.78 But two aspects are worth recalling. One is the way in which the Lampung base attracted a group of Ngruki alumni and followers of Abdullah Sungkar; the other is the effort made to reach out to an older generation of DI fighters to see if the movement could be revived yet again.

The Ngruki link in Lampung was a direct result of the government crackdown in 1984-1985 on the usroh movement that Sungkar and Ba'asyir had set up in Central Java. Beginning in late 1985, several members of the movement fled to Lampung to escape arrest and gradually came under the protection of Warsidi, a Javanese religious teacher. By 1988, they and Warsidi decided to set up their own pesantren in Cihideung, Talangsari, Lampung and create an "Islamic village."

At least one member stayed in touch with fellow usroh members in Jakarta, and on 12 December 1988, in a meeting in Cibinong, Bogor, West Java, the Warsidi group and Nur Hidayat's Ring Ancol decided to join forces. They would all emigrate -- hijrah -- to Lampung, with Nur Hidayat as their leader (amir musafir); they would make the new Islamic village there not only a model of Islamic law and economic enterprise, but also a centre for military training; and they would bring the major factions of DI together in a meeting at the Cihideung pesantren on 15 February 1989. New leaders and a more permanent structure for the village-cum-organisation would be chosen then.

Nur Hidayat, interviewed in 2000, stressed peaceful objectives79 but others present recalled it very differently. Lampung, they said, was to be the base for a new DI uprising when the military forces were ready.80 One man noted that through his DI contacts, he called an Indonesian mujahidin who had recently returned from Afghanistan to see if he would provide military training. The man refused, saying it was too risky. In 2003, the same man, now a JI member, was arrested in connection with the Marriott bombing.81

As a result of the meeting, members of both groups were dispatched in late December 1988 and early January 1989 to contact former DI leaders and urge them to join the movement -- or at least come to the Cihideung pesantren in Lampung on 15 February to talk about it. The Warsidi group agreed to contact DI people in Lampung and Central Java. Members of Nur Hidayat's group sent one person each to:

- Cianjur, Subang, and Bandung, to meet a faction of DI led by a man called Ajengan Kecil;
- Palembang, to meet Bardan Kintarto, arrested at the time of the Komando Jihad raids there;
- Medan, to meet Gaos Taufik, who had been released from prison in 1987;
- Balikpapan and South Sulawesi, to touch base with DI-South Sulawesi people at the Hidayatullah pesantren in Gunung Tembak and with Kahar Muzakkar's followers in Makassar;
- Surabaya and Malang (contacts not clear); and
- Lombok and Sumbawa, to contact Abdul Ghani Masykur and others in Mataram, Dompul and Bima.

Ten years after the Komando Jihad arrests, there was little interest among those contacted in another attempt to revive DI, except among the Lombok and Sumbawa men. They agreed to attend but the meeting never took place. Local officials, suspicious of activities at the pesantren, summoned Warsidi in January 1989 for questioning. He never responded, and on 6 February, a group of military and police officers went to the pesantren to be met with a hail of arrows. The subdistrict military commander was killed. The next day, the then regional military commander, Hendropriyono, led an assault on the school in which an unknown number of people -- but certainly many dozens -- were killed. The latest reincarnation of Darul Islam was crushed.

In reflecting on their failure more than a decade later, a member of Nur Hidayat's group said their biggest mistake was to seek the advice of DI elders, so many of whom had links to intelligence.82 Note worthy is that while the proponents of military action were inspired by DI and saw themselves as working for

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77 Ibid, p.5.
78 Gerakan Usroh, op. cit.
79 Ibid, pp. 88-89.
80 Isman, pp.43-44; interviews in Jakarta, November 2003. That Nur Hidayat and his followers had armed struggle in mind is reinforced by the indictment against one of the men they contacted in early 1989, Haji Abdul Gani Masykur. See Kejaksaan Negeri Bima, Surat Dakwaan Nomor 21/L.2.11.4/Fpt.1/6/1989. [indictment of Masykur by Bima District Court].

81 Crisis Group interview, November 2003.
82 Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, February 2004. One could argue that their biggest mistake, of many, was to kill the military commander.
an Islamic state, the links to the "genuine" DI structure were tenuous. Warsidi reportedly had been inducted into the organisation by Ajengan Masduki, who had a strong Lampung connection, and Abdul Qadir Baraja's twelve-year-old son was killed at the pesantren when the assault took place. Warsidi's followers consisted largely of young men involved in the usroh movement and as such were linked to Abdullah Sungkar and the DI connection there. But KW8, the Lampung command of DI, apparently never formally embraced the operation.

C. RELEVANCE FOR TODAY

There may be a lesson here about how splinter groups from JI emerge: younger members of a JI subdivision (wakalah), perhaps inspired by JI's earlier exploits, could plan and carry out an operation in the name of JI without the endorsement of its leadership and without the same level of expertise. The difference is that in Lampung, the only weapons that Nur Hidayat's group had were arrows; anyone acting in the name of JI would almost certainly have access to guns and bombs.

Two other points are worth noting in relation to JI. First, it has been a feature of various efforts to revive Darul Islam that many of those imprisoned after the revolt (inevitably) fail are not in the least chastened and try again when they get out, sometimes in a different form, sometimes with different allies. It means that jihadist groups know -- or at least believe -- that the pool of people imprisoned for activities along these lines may be available for future operations and appear to have little reluctance in contacting them. Nur Hidayat claims he was contacted about taking part in the Christmas Eve bombing operations but refused, and he was not the only one.

Secondly, it is noteworthy how often Lampung emerges as an important base of DI-JI. In 1976, it was a staging ground for the attempted revival of Darul Islam through Komando Jihad. Abdul Qadir Baraja, whose book on jihad was circulating in Ngruki around this time, was a DI leader then and continues to operate out of Lampung.85 In 1987, as will be seen below, DI leaders met in Lampung to decide on a new (or acting) leader; Utomo alias Abu Faruq, who succeeded him in about 1997, and several others. The split was not just over which leader was more desirable. It was also over religious teachings. DI-Lampung members maintained that as long as one was living in enemy territory, it was not obligatory to pray five times a day but that for tactical reasons, one could merge morning and noon prayers, for example. For a group of DI members who had acquired a more salafi perspective, this was anathema. They left DI and joined with some of Sungkar's followers in Solo to become the nucleus of JI-Lampung.

One prominent member of JI-Lampung, Utomo alias Abu Faruq, was originally from Trenggalek, East Java. In 1985, while he was studying in Solo -- at the same university where Warman had shot the assistant rector six years earlier -- he met Abu Fatih, later to head JI's Mantiqi II, who persuaded him to join DI. Abu Fatih also arranged for him to go to Afghanistan, where he became close to Thoriquiddin alias Abu Rusdan. On his return, he went to Solo but in 1988 was advised by friends there to make the hijrah to Lampung because Central Java was no longer safe.

We know that people from Lampung were being sent to Camp Hudaibiyah in Mindanao in 1999,86 that a wakalah was functioning there in 2002,87 and that in 2003, Lampung was still considered the third most

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84 His movement to restore the caliphate (Khilafatul Muslimin) has a Lampung address, and he himself travels between Lampung and Sumbawa, where he is originally from, on a regular basis.
85 Crisis Group interview, November 2004. This group include Yasir, Madrus, Idris, and Ilyas.
86 Places of hijrah also become points of interaction among people from different backgrounds and areas.
87 The Lampung participants in one three-month class at Camp Hudaibiyah in 1999 included Supri alias Anas; Edi Suprapto alias Yasir alias Tsalabah, who by 2002 was treasurer of the wakalah; and Naufal. See interrogation deposition of Ilham Sopandi alias Husni in Berkas Perkara No. Pol BPI 07./XII/2003/Dit-VI versus gangka Solihin als Rofi, Jakarta December 2003.
88 The head of the Lampung wakalah in late 2002 was Utomo alias Abu Faruq. He contributed two of his men to the training of a new JI special forces unit, Samuri Farich Mustofa and Tsalabah. See testimony of expert witness Lobby Loqman SH, 12 December 2003 in case of Solihin als Rofi,,Perkara No. Pol BPI 07./XII/2003/Dit-VI.
important stronghold of JI, after Central Java and East Java. In late 2002-early 2003, some members of the military section of the Lampung wakalah were being sent to train in the new JI special forces unit being set up by Mantiqi II, and several important meetings to plan the Marriott bombing were held in Lampung in June 2003.

VII. AJENGAN MASDUKI AND NEW RIFTS

In studies of Jemaah Islamiyah, Ajengan Masduki is best known as the man whose differences with Abdullah Sungkar led the latter to break from Darul Islam and found JI in 1993. But through the 1980s and 1990s, he played an important role as mentor to many who became involved in violence that was often linked to, or allied with JI, if not directly under its command. He sent his own men to Afghanistan and Mindanao, and while many crossed over to Sungkar, some stayed loyal. Masduki as much as anyone kept the militant wing of Darul Islam (fisabilillah) together in Indonesia while Sungkar and Ba'asyir were in Malaysia, and while he and Sungkar remained at odds until the latter's death in 1999, there was more communication and interaction between their followers. Masduki loyalists thus were another pool of operatives on which jihadists could draw.

Ajengan Masduki was born in Ciamis. Known as one of DI's true Islamic scholars, he reportedly had memorised the Quran by sixteen. He was one of the very few Darul Islam leaders from a Nahdlatul Ulama background. He fought in Hizbullah against the Dutch and was at the Cisayeung, West Java meeting in 1946 that laid the groundwork for establishment of Darul Islam three years later. He became the first DI subdistrict chief in Gunung Cupu, Tasikmalaya, and according to one source, was the first subdistrict-level commander commissioned by Kartosoewirjo. He became a member of the Dewan Fatwa (Fatwa Council) under Daud Beureueh, and in 1979, when Adah Djaelani became imam, became the Dewan's deputy head.

Masduki was arrested in 1982, one of the last caught in the post-Komando Jihad crackdown of 1979-1982. He was held for two years and when released, returned to the Cianjur, West Java area.

A. MASDUKI BECOMES IMAM

In 1984, when he was released, most other senior DI leaders were still in prison, including Adah Djaelani, the DI imam. Over the next two years, several members of Gaos Taufik's special forces were released, including a few who settled around Babakan Ciamis, Kotabumi, Lampung. They began to rebuild their lives, starting businesses and reviving DI. The reputations of DI and Warman were such that no one dared oppose them.

One who set up a contracting company to build roads in Lampung said with obvious pride, "no one got in our

89 Crisis Group interviews, January 2004.
way. Soldiers and thugs were afraid of us. They said we were part of Warman's gang.\footnote{Crisis Group interview, November 2004.}

In late 1986, these men decided the void in the imamate caused by the Komando Jihad arrests had to be filled, because DI was in a state of paralysis. Ajengan Masduki's name came up. All agreed he was the most suitable choice, at least in a caretaker capacity. They then got in a car, took the ferry to Java, and drove to Cianjur to see their candidate. Ajengan Masduki said he would do anything to serve the mujahidin. "If they lose a soldier, I will become a soldier. If they lose a parent, I will be a father to them. If they have lost their imam, I am prepared to lead them, as long as everything is done according to established procedures\textsuperscript{91}, one man recalled him saying.

Accordingly, some time in 1987, at the urging of the Lampung men and Ajengan Masduki, DI's Fatwa Council issued a decree calling for the convening of the Majelis Syuro, the highest legislative body of the Indonesian Islamic state\footnote{Crisis Group interview, November 2004.}, consisting of the DI cabinet and representatives from every KW.\footnote{Crisis Group interview, November 2004.}

On 4 November 1987, in Babakan Ciamis, the Majelis Syuro met and considered three candidates: Abdul Fatah Wirananggpati, one of the original West Java commanders; Abdullah Sungkar, representing the younger generation; and Masduki.\footnote{Ibid.}

But Masduki never had serious opposition. Not only had he himself been a member of the preparatory committee for the meeting, but he had earlier consulted with Gaos Taufik and Ale AT, apparently in an effort to ensure that Sumatra and Sulawesi would accept his candidacy. Some versions stress that this was done with Adah Djaelani's full knowledge and acquiescence that there was need for a leader on the outside, at least in an acting capacity, until he was released.\footnote{Crisis Group interview, November 2004.} Several DI leaders were unhappy, however, and accused Masduki of usurpation.

Once chosen acting imam, Masduki put his own men in key positions, including Mamin alias Ustadz Haris as state secretary and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as minister of justice. Abdullah Sungkar became responsible for foreign affairs, in particular seeking political support and funding from abroad.\footnote{Mia Ibrahim became commander for Java-Madura.}

The main goals of the Masduki cabinet were to build international support and strengthen DI's military capacity. Sungkar focused on raising funds from Saudi Arabia and the Rabitah, while Broto, as one of Mia Ibrahim's top staff members, was tasked with streamlining the sending of DI recruits to Afghanistan.

In 1988, in the interests of furthering these goals, Masduki left with a DI delegation for Pakistan and Afghanistan. It included Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, and two others. Sungkar reportedly used the visit to introduce Masduki to Abdul Rasul Sayaf, whose camp in Sada was training DI recruits, as well as Abdullah Azzam, the leading ideologue of salafi jihadism, and other senior mujahidin commanders.

The delegation left a deep impression on one Indonesian who accompanied it. He said that even though he was old, Ajengan Masduki was the strongest of the lot and made it to a camp in northern Khost five kilometres into the mountains, on his own steam. While they were there, the area was bombed by Soviet airplanes, and most of those present ran to caves. Masduki stayed outside, saying, "This is great, it reminds me of the old days!\textsuperscript{97}"

His courage earned him the admiration not only of the Indonesians but also the Afghans.

The only problem was that Masduki insisted on going around the camp in shorts, despite a regulation that all had to wear trousers that covered the knees. An Indonesian there said, "he looked like a tourist. We wanted to tell him he couldn't do this, but he was our imam…" More worrying was his preaching which, from a salafi perspective, included objectionable superstition (\textit{ilmu ladinun}).\footnote{Crisis Group interview, November 2004.}

\footnote{Kartosewirjo and entrusted to Abi Karim alias Karim Hasan to give to Ajengan Masduki. But Abi Karim, who came from a Muhammadiyah background, objected to serving a leader from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) background. Ajengan Masduki did not know of the letter's existence until it was revealed in a DI meeting in Jakarta in 1996.}
\footnote{His actual title was Kuasa Usaha Komandemen Tertinggi (literally Charge d'Affaires of the High Command).}
\footnote{Crisis Group interview, November 2004.}
\footnote{For example, he spoke of Allah imparting special powers to students, so they did not have to study: once they were chosen, they could memorise the Quran in three days.}
The trip to Afghanistan had unforeseen consequences. Exposure to the Sayyaf circle started some around Masduki thinking in terms of a caliphate as their ultimate objective rather than the narrower goal of an Islamic state in Indonesia. They began to see their struggle up until then as mired in parochial, nationalist concerns. But as they moved to a more internationalist outlook, others in DI saw Masduki and his men deviating from Kartosoewirjo's guidelines and needing to be brought back into line.

The trip caused friction in other ways as well. One man in the delegation was upset that in meetings with Sayyaf, Abdullah Sungkar rather than Masduki did all the talking. Masduki could not speak Arabic, and he had asked Sungkar to speak on behalf of the group -- but the impression left was that Sungkar had deliberately excluded Masduki.

When the Sungkar-Masduki split came in 1992, it was clear there was competition between the two for dominance in the movement but there were other factors involved as well. Sungkar, a puritanical salafi, accused Masduki of Sufi tendencies, by which he was apparently referring to some of the teachings mentioned above, as well as to his Nahdlatul Ulama background.

Masduki and some of those around him, questioned Sungkar's accounting for funds used for the Afghanistan training. They also said he had personalised the old Darul Islam induction oath so that now recruits swore loyalty to him rather than the organisation. Moreover, they said, Sungkar was insisting that all returning Afghan veterans remain under his control, rather than going back to their original KWs.

Finally, DI people in Malaysia who were loyal to Ajengan Masduki or Gaos Taufik found Sungkar and his people arrogant, particularly on religious matters. "They didn't quote the Quran every time we opened our mouths", said one. A split seemed inevitable.

Jemaah Islamiyah officially came into being on 1 January 1993, and Ajengan Masduki used Sungkar's defection as an excuse to consolidate his ranks. One interesting fallout from the split was that all the students at Pondok Ngruki whose parents were Masduki loyalists moved to another pesantren, Nurul Salam in Ciamis.

Adah Djaelani was released from jail in 1994, and over the next four years, most of the rest of the top West Java leaders were freed as well. They began to hold sporadic meetings at which the main issue was whether Masduki would continue as imam or the position would revert to Adah, and whether DI's structure should be the imamate of 1974, 1979, or 1987, with some of the changes Masduki had implemented.

B. THE JAKARTA COMMAND SPLITS

A new complication occurred as these discussions ensued -- the October 1996 split within KW9.

As noted above, KW9 is thought to have been founded in 1975 or 1976, with a man named Abi Karim alias Karim Hasan as administrative head and Seno alias Basyar as military commander. Other leaders included Haji Rais, Nurdin Yahya, Ahmad Sobari and Ahmad Sumargono, better known today as the founder in 1986 of the Muslim solidarity organisation, KISDI. Many of these men, including Abi Karim, were arrested in 1980 in connection with Komando Jihad, and sentenced to lengthy terms.

When their leaders went to prison, the remaining KW9 members used the Jakarta Muballigh Corps (KMJ) as cover to continue DI proselytising. KMJ supplied the preachers for Friday prayers for many Jakarta mosques, and by becoming active in KMJ, DI members could ensure they would have opportunities to preach and recruit new members.

As this was happening, Panji Gumilang alias Abu Toto, founder of al-Zaytun pesantren, was beginning his DI career. He had joined KW9 in 1978 but after only a few months, he was arrested for taking part in a GPI demonstration and detained for eight months in Bandung -- where he shared a cell with Mursalin Dahlan. In 1981, after many of the top West Java leaders were arrested, he fled to Sabah, Malaysia with the help of Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, where he worked as a preacher, supported by the World Muslim League (Rabita al-Alam al-Islami). He returned to Banten frequently during this period, his tickets reportedly paid for by Haji Sanusi, the former minister later to be arrested in the plot against Soeharto.

In 1983-1984, while Abu Toto was still in Malaysia, most KW9 leaders were released from prison. Almost immediately rifts developed among them. Some who had come to know Adah Djaelani in prison decided they could not stay in Darul Islam if someone of his dubious character was in charge. They left. KW9 and came under the control of three men, Abi Karim, Nurdin Yahya, and Haji Rais.

100 Crisis Group interviews, July 2004.
When Abu Toto returned from Sabah, he rejoined KW9 and attached himself to Abi Karim. From 1987, wherever Abi Karim went, Abu Toto was almost certain to accompany him. He also made regular visits to the still-detained Adah Djaelani, who became very taken by his creative fund-raising.\(^{103}\) By 1990, with support from Adah Djaelani and Abi Karim, Abu Toto became chief of staff for KW9.

A prophecy was circulating in Banten at the time that when a year with an aleph (the number "1") joined with the number "9", a major event would take place. They interpreted this to mean that in 1991, DI would rise again, stronger than ever. To prepare, they reorganised the KW9 organisation from top to bottom and increased the obligatory contributions from members. In the process, Abu Toto took on an increasingly important role.

Abi Karim died in 1992, and Haji Rais took over, only to be arrested for DI/NII activities the following year -- some say through the machinations of Abu Toto, who then became head of KW9 and continued to distinguish himself by fund-raising. When Adah Djaelani was finally released in 1994, the two became very close, and in October 1996, without any consultation, Adah issued a decree replacing Tahmid with Abu Toto as chief of staff of DI.

The decision outraged many senior DI members, including Gaos Taufik and Mia Ibrahim, not to mention Tahmid himself. They decided that because he had violated DI's own regulations by not consulting the Imamate Council, they would no longer acknowledge him as leader. Veteran DI members Ahmad Hussein and Ules Sudjai supported Adah, and the Tahmid-Gaos Taufik faction installed Mahfudz Siddiq as head of KW9.\(^{104}\)

### C. THE CISARUA MEETING, DECEMBER 1998

It was in this state of institutional uproar that a major Darul Islam meeting took place in Cisarua in December 1998. It was billed as an effort to settle the question of leadership and bring the three major command areas together: Aceh-Sumatra, Java-Madura, and Sulawesi-Kalimantan. Participants came from eleven provinces, according to the recollection of one, and most of the senior old guard was present.\(^{105}\)

The key issue was whether Adah Djaelani or Ajengan Masduki should hold the top position. The somewhat convoluted decision was that Darul Islam should adhere in principle to the 1979 structure, but because Adah in the intervening years had deviated from both the DI constitution and Quranic teachings on several counts, he would not be called back as imam. Instead Tahmid Kartosoewirjo would be installed as chief of staff, and it would be up to him to convene an executive council to choose an imam.

Ajengan Masduki's followers objected, saying that if his position as imam was to be questioned, the council that installed him in 1987 should be reconvened. This was rejected, and Tahmid and his supporters carried the day.\(^{106}\) No one suggested Tahmid would be imam but all DI forces were, nevertheless, supposed to be turned over to him as the civilian coordinator of what was essentially a military organisation.\(^{107}\)

Masduki's supporters were particularly upset. Not only was their leader pushed out of power, but his hitherto loyal adjutant, Broto, crossed over to Tahmid's camp and was rewarded with the position of deputy to Mia Ibrahim. This defection appalled the Masduki camp where Ajengan and Broto had been regarded as inseparable "as sugar and its sweetness".\(^{108}\)

Few were happy with the results of the meeting. Tahmid was widely seen as weak, with no real power base of his own. Cisarua effectively meant there was no longer even pretence of a single leader. Masduki retained a small group of hardcore loyalists known as Kelompok 87, mostly based in Lampung.\(^{109}\)

Younger DI members were particularly disappointed. A participant told Crisis Group, "Cisarua didn't decide anything for us, so we were forced to take the initiative and develop new groups on our own".\(^{110}\) A Masduki

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103 Abu Toto raised obligatory annual contributions for KW9 members from Rp.10,000 to Rp.50,000, and imposed an extraordinary array of new levies. Members were asked to make payments (shodaqoh), when they joined; when they wanted to atone for sins; when they got married; even when they went home to celebrate the end of Ramadan. Compared to other KWs, KW9 was rolling in money.

104 Mahfudz Siddiq became the mentor of Kang Jaja, the founder of the Banten group responsible for the September 2004 bomb.
The period from 1998 onwards came to be known in DI circles as "the time of many imams". It generated a new phenomenon: groups of DI members with no structural affiliation at all. They were different from "Rings" like Ring Condet, which operated outside their geographic area but continued to be affiliated to a particular KW. These new groups were loyal to an individual, considered themselves DI, but operated entirely outside the formal organisation.

It was the Ambon conflict, coming on the heels of the Cisarua meeting, that gave the younger members a chance at leadership and did what usroh had done twenty years earlier: it rejuvenated and radicalised the movement.

VIII. AMIN AND THE ABU BAKAR BATTALION

Ambon erupted in violence on 19 January 1999. The desire of DI and JI to defend Muslims under attack there led to the emergence of new militias that then fed into the ever-changing kaleidoscope of groups and alliances. Some of these came to work with or intersect with JI, including in the bombing on 9 September 2004 in front of the Australian embassy in Jakarta.

A. ASADULLAH AND THE ABU BAKAR BATTALION

The conflict generated a debate within Darul Islam, as it had within JI, about whether the violence constituted cause for jihad. The silence from the DI leadership, including Tahmid and Broto, was deafening, and several of the more militant members were outraged that no fatwa was forthcoming stating that jihad in Ambon was obligatory for all Muslims. These militants included:

- Yoyok alias Danu, the gang leader from Ring Condet;
- Zulfikar, from Tanjung Priok, recruited into DI by Yoyok and sent to Mindanao;
- Abdullah, a Mindanao veteran; and
- Asadullah alias Yahya alias Ahmad Riyadi, who followed Yoyok into JI's West Java-Jakarta leadership structure.

Asadullah had a particularly fearsome reputation. In 1997, he went to Mindanao with the assistance of Syawal Yasin, a Makassar-based Afghan veteran who had married Abdullah Sungkar's step-daughter.112

Sometime in mid-1999, the four men decided to break with the old DI leadership completely and form the Abu Bakar Battalion, with the aim of recruiting and training fighters for Ambon. They were supported by Haris Fadillah alias Abu Dzar, later better known as the father-in-law of Omar al-Faruq, and a man named Edy Rianto alias Amir, a graduate of a technical high school in east Jakarta, specialising in electrical repairs.113

Together they formed six companies (kompi), "A" to "F", altogether involving some 60 men.114 The Battalion

decided to embark on a campaign of fa'i to raise funds, and it was here that Kompi F came into its own. Its exploits drew so many new people that it changed its name to Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (AMIN) and became an organisation in its own right.115

All the most radical members of the Abu Bakar Battalion, some of them ex-thugs from Tanjung Priok or the Tanah Abang areas of Jakarta, were grouped in Kompi F/AMIN, including Yoyok.116 It was AMIN that was responsible for the robbery of a Bank Central Asia (BCA) branch and the almost simultaneous small explosion at a public telephone office (wartel) near Hayam Wuruk Plaza in Jakarta on 15 April 1999, the bombing of the Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta four days later, and the robbing of a petrol station in Lampung.

The BCA was reportedly targeted because the perpetrators believed it provided funds for military operations, and they hoped the proceeds would cover the cost of guns for Ambon.117 Interrogation of the suspects quickly uncovered that they had lived and trained at an isolated community outside, Warung Menteng village, Cijeruk, Bogor, about 80 km. southwest of Jakarta, at the base of an old volcano called Gunung Salak. Beginning in 1998, some in the community had built rudimentary homes and later a tiny mosque -- eighteen square meters -- they called the Musholla al-Muhajirin.118 Several households made their living by subsistence farming, with the women selling cassava chips and other snacks in the Bogor bus terminal. Neighbours interacted mostly with the women, who dressed more conservatively than the norm; the men mostly commuted to Jakarta, and no one had a very clear idea of what they did. Every Sunday, about a dozen would leave in a van for military training in a cleared area on nearby Roke Hill (Bukit Roke), on land that had belonged to the Railway Authority (Perusahaan Umum Kereta Api).119

Indonesian police quickly decided they were dealing with a small group of perhaps two dozen men, led by Eddy Rianto, and including Naiman, one of the bank robbers, who was on the administrative staff of a Jakarta high school; Eddy Taufik, another robber, who was a day labourer who also occasionally drove a pedicab (becak) to earn extra money; and Suhendi, also a casual labourer, whose wife sold sweet potatoes and bananas to contribute to the family income.120 In the bank job, those three worked with Rojak, a gang member from Tanah Abang, and a man named Mustaqim.121

But AMIN was bigger, and survived much longer, than the police could have guessed. In December 1999, the first group of its recruits left for Ambon, under the command of Abu Dzar.122 They included two DI members, Daeng and Rudi, and a young man named Ahmad Sayid Maulana, later to be arrested off the coast of Malaysia in September 2003.

B. AHMAD SAYID MAULANA

Ahmad Sayid Maulana is a walking history of the evolution of DI and radical Islam in Indonesia. He grew up in the Pemjompongan area of Jakarta and first joined Darul Islam in 1994 after he graduated from high school. At the time, Broto was the commander of DI-Jakarta, and Maulana was inducted by one of his subordinates in a mass ceremony with 40 others in Cisaat, Sukabumi. Maulana became a regular participant at religious study sessions held in a DI mosque behind the Sarinah department store on Jalan Thamrin, one of Jakarta's main thoroughfares.123

115 The reason the name was chosen was as follows: Yoyok had been studying the Quran with a controversial religious leader from Riau named Syamsuri, who claimed to be Kahar Muzakkar, the leader of the Darul Islam rebellion in South Sulawesi. Kahar had been captured and killed by the army but the whereabouts of his grave was never made public, nor was his body ever seen, and Kyai Syamsuri capitalised on this for his impersonation. Syamsuri was brought to Jakarta by a retired naval officer, Yanwir Koto, who introduced him to Jaka, a Florinese member of DI. Jaka then introduced him to members of DI-Sulawesi who lived in Jakarta and he began attracting a large following — reportedly including Syawal Yasin. In his sermons, Kyai Syamsuri (who does not look remotely like Kahar Muzakkar) stressed the importance of Islamic law and said what was needed was a force called AMIN (Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara) to bring it about. He mentioned AMIN specifically in a lecture in Bandung in 1998. Yoyok learned of the lecture and adopted the name AMIN for Kompi F.

116 Other members included Tajul Arifin alias Sabar alias Pipin, Banten; Zulfikar; Mustaqim; Rozak; Ali Mudin; Ikhwam; Darna; Yusuf; Edi Junaedi, Ahmad Said Maulana, and Sarmo. The latter was beaten to death by a mob after he took part with Tajul in the attack on Matori Abdul Jalil.117 Crisis Group interview, January 2004.

117 "Muhajirin" means exiles or émigrés.
After the Ambon conflict erupted, Maulana left the Broto group to join Kompi F/AMIN and went to Ambon with Abu Dzar. DI members credited Maulana and Abu Dzar jointly with the creation of a mujahidin force in Ambon.124

Maulana became close to the Sulawesi fighters in there and was virtually adopted by Agus Dwikarna. Through him, he became a member of the Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia (RPII), a DI splinter group based in Makassar that saw itself as the heir of the republic proclaimed by Kahar Muzakkar in 1962. He retained his membership in AMIN, however, and in that capacity went to Poso, with other AMIN members, in August 2000. They took with them seven rifles and seven revolvers from a raid on a Brimob weapons depot in Ambon in June 2000. In Makassar, where they stopped en route, Agus Dwikarna introduced them to Agung Hamid, head of Laskar Jundullah, and gave them the names of local contacts in Poso.

Through his involvement in Ambon and Poso, Maulana came to know Arismunandar, a JI member and, as head of the Solo office of the Islamic charity KOMPAK, one of its financiers.125 He visited Solo in 2002 where he met Bali bombers Dulmatin and Umar Patek, and through them, went off to Mindanao for military training (tadrib) the same year. When he returned to Indonesia, he made a living selling VCDs about Islam and Muslim conflicts in the Depok train station. In February 2003, he was approached by Umar Patek to take him to Mindanao, because by this time he reportedly had become reasonably proficient in Maguindanao, the language spoken around the training camps used by the MILF and also was familiar with one of the main routes to safety there. Asadulloh told Maulana to take Umar Patek to Tarakan by plane, then go up the coast to Tawao in Sabah, Malaysia by boat. In Tawao, a Filipino would guide them to Zamboanga. After safely delivering Umar Patek, Maulana returned to Indonesia, only to be asked by Dulmatin in April 2003 to take him to Mindanao after the arrests in the Poso-Palu area where Dulmatin had sought refuge.

It is not clear whether Maulana stayed in Mindanao after delivering Dulmatin or returned to Indonesia and left for Mindanao again, but in September 2003, he was on a boat that was stopped by a Malaysian marine patrol off the coast of Sabah. He told Malaysian investigators he had just completed a bomb-making course and was planning to return to Jakarta to blow up the Indonesian police headquarters.126

C. MORE ACTIONS IN JAKARTA

After a group of AMIN recruits was already in Ambon, Asadulloh continued to command other members from a Jakarta base. On 5 March 2000, acting on Asadullah's orders, several members attacked Matori Abdul Jalil, then head of the PKB party, later defence minister, with a machete, in what was clearly attempted murder. Asadullah knew Matori personally, and Matori reportedly had helped him out financially from time to time. But around 1999, the assistance stopped, and Asadulloh decided that Matori had betrayed the Islamic cause and turned to the left. The murder was reportedly planned at the home of another Kompi F/AMIN member named Zulfikar, better known as Pikar, a Mindanao alumnus.

The attack on Matori, which led to the arrest of a Kompi F/AMIN man named Tajul Arifin alias Sabar alias Pipin, resulted in a split between Asadulloh and Yoyok, who sought protection with Gaos Taufik. He was never arrested nor was Asadulloh who also fled.

But AMIN kept reappearing.

D. RELEVANCE FOR TODAY

Several lessons come out of the AMIN/Kompi F experience. The first two are obvious:

- training programs, whether Afghanistan, Mindanao or local ones like Cijeruk, are always places where new bonds are forged and lasting friendships made. Alumni of a program are likely to be able to call on fellow alumni for help in times of need, in a way that may strengthen a logistical support network.

- Local communal conflicts such as Ambon and Poso serve as important incentives for reactivating old networks and reinvigorating jihadist groups. It is one more reason for trying to prevent simmering tensions from erupting into violence.

A third is that thugs-turned-mujahidin who have lapsed back into thuggery are a particularly dangerous element in the mix. They have no hesitation about using violence, and when a new motivation for jihad emerges, they have particularly strong incentives for joining: absolution, acceptance, and a chance to show off fighting skills.

The 9 September 2004 bombing in front of the Australian embassy in the Kuningan area of Jakarta weaves together strands from AMIN, Poso, and the South Sulawesi and West Java parts of Darul Islam. The bomb killed twelve, injured hundreds more, and blew the glass out of office buildings as far as the eye could see. Police quickly determined that two of the most wanted men in Southeast Asia were involved, Malaysian nationals Azhari Husin and Noordin Mohamed Top, both JI members. But almost as quickly it became apparent that they had worked closely with yet another splinter of DI commonly known as Ring Banten, or the Banten group, after the area west of Jakarta that became their base.127

Ring Banten has never been part of DI and does not answer to its command structure but the 9 September bombing was not the first time members of DI and the Banten group had collaborated. Since 1999, the group had run its own military training activities in Pandeglang, Banten to which DI members were sometimes invited as instructors. It sent mujahidin to the communal conflicts in Ambon and Poso, and it had its own men trained in Mindanao.

**A. Kang Jaja**

The head of the Banten group is known as Kang Jaja alias Akhdam, now in his 50s. He joined Darul Islam in the 1980s, following in the footsteps of a family member. Jaja was relatively well off, as the part owner and manager of a courier company, CV Sajira Media Karsa -- a name chosen to fit the monogram of the founder of Darul Islam, Soekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo. He became a donor to the activities of the KW9 under Mahfud Siddiq and helped underwrite the costs of the December 1998 Cisarua meeting.128

Kang Jaja first began providing sporadic military training to his men in 1996 in Malimping, Banten through a man named Nurudin alias Zaid Butong, a kung fu expert from Solo who was a member of the same class in Afghanistan as JI luminaries Thoriquuddin alias Abu Rusdan and Mustofa.129 He was also one of few DI recruits who stayed loyal to Ajengan Masduki after the latter's rift with Sungkar. Because of the difficulties of conducting this kind of training during the Soeharto years, however, the program was neither regular nor particularly well organised.

The fall of Soeharto opened new possibilities, and at the Cisarua meeting, the DI leadership decided to build its military capacity by sending cadres for training in Mindanao. The program was under the direct supervision of Mia Ibrahim, whose designation was War Commander for All of Indonesia (Komandan Perang Seluruh Indonesia). Coordinating the dispatch of men to the Philippines fell to the commanders of KW9, and it was they who asked help from Syawal Yasin, son of a DI Sulawesi fighter, son-in-law of Abdullah Sungkar, and one of the most respected Indonesian instructors in Afghanistan.

It is not clear who in KW9 made the initial contact with Syawal, who had already established a separate camp on MILF grounds for training recruits from South Sulawesi. But Kang Jaja had met him through another Afghan veteran, Firdaus alias Azzam alias Nyong Ali, and both Firdaus and Syawal became instructors in the first training program to result from the Cisarua meeting in early 1999.130 A JI Afghan veteran named Edi Setiono alias Usman alias Abbas, later imprisoned for his role in the Atrium Mall bombing of September 2001, was also brought in to teach.

Out of the twenty men, including Kang Jaja himself, who took part, nine were sent on to Mindanao through Syawal's good offices in May 1999. One of these was Iwan alias Rois, Kang Jaja's nephew by marriage, the man arrested for the Australian embassy bombing.131

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127 Since 1999, Banten has been a separate province, but for most of Indonesia's history it was part of West Java.
128 Crisis Group interview, November 2004. Mahfud Siddiq was head of the fisabilillah faction's KW 9; Panji Gumilang alias Abu Toto, the director of the al-Zaytun pesantren in Indramayu, West Java, was once head of KW9.
129 He was called Butong after the martial arts form he practiced, Butongpay. Zaid Butong is now reportedly close to MI LFF grounds for training recruits from South Sulawesi.
130 Firdaus helped supply ammunition for Poso through his brother, then the police chief of Ternate. A volunteer for the Islamic medical relief agency MER-C, he was arrested briefly after the Marriott bombings.
131 Iwan alias Rois married the daughter of Kang Jaja's brother. He only began using the name Rois in preparation for the embassy bombing and is known to all his DI associates as Iwan. In February 2000, several of Kang Jaja's recruits were caught in the Sanghihe-Talaud islands off the coast of Menado, returning from Mindanao with arms and ammunition. Syawal Yasin was arrested with them. All were sentenced to eight months and fifteen days and were free by late 2000. They included Agus Sugandi bin Abdul Rasyid alias Suganda from Pangarangan, Lebak, Banten; Hadi bin Sahmat alias Hadidi from Kedung, Bogonegoro, Banten; and Burhanuddin alias Burhan from Limuncang, West Java.
After the MILF's Camp Abubakar was overrun by the Philippines army in mid-2000, two members of the Banten group, Abdullah and Abdul Fatah, were left stranded and had to be brought back to Indonesia by one of Syawal's men.\(^{132}\) The assistance was not just one way. Through his courier company, Kang Jaja helped Syawal bring in arms and other equipment from Mindanao. It was Syawal's responsibility to get the goods from the Philippines to Makassar and then to Surabaya. Once there, the company reportedly took over and could get them to anywhere on Java, including back to Banten.

Kang Jaja was instrumental in the Mindanao training, not only because his men were among the first recruits, but also because he helped underwrite the costs and provided a place for preliminary training in Cimelati, Pasir Eurih, Saketi, in Banten. But he soon fell out with Mia Ibrahim, the overall DI military commander.

Sometime in 2000, Mia decided, for reasons unclear to other DI members, to put a temporary freeze on building military capacity and stopped the Mindanao training. Kang Jaja was not pleased. For one thing, it meant he had spent considerable time and money to no useful purpose. For another, it meant that DI was abandoning jihad. Kang Jaja had sent men to Ambon as well as the Philippines, and he had become more and more committed to the salafi jihadi ideology of some of his new associates, like Syawal Yasin. He broke with the KW9 command structure, and Ring Banten became independent of DI.

**B. RING BANTEN IN POSO**

After the break with KW9, Kang Jaja continued to build up the military capacity of his followers. He kept the training camp in Saketi, Banten going, went on sending men to Mindanao, and stepped up recruitment for the local jihads in Ambon, Maluku, and Poso, Central Sulawesi. In the latter areas, he worked closely with Laskar Jundullah from South Sulawesi -- he actually moved there in September 2001 -- and Jemaah Islamiyah. Suryadi Mas'oed from Laskar Jundullah helped him purchase arms from Mindanao. By 2002, according to a source, Ring Banten had acquired dozens of pistols and automatic rifles, 25,000 rounds of ammunition, several hundred kilos of explosives, and two rocket-propelled grenade launchers.\(^{133}\)

He also worked with the other jihadist organisations to set up a joint training camp in Pendolo, on the shores of Lake Poso in Central Sulawesi. Inspired by the way Laskar Jundullah used the South Sulawesi branch of KOMPAK, a charity, as a cover for its activities, Kang Jaja founded a charity that he called Bulan Sabit Merah (Red Crescent) as a front for his military pursuits.\(^{134}\) His followers were sometimes known in the Poso area as the Red Crescent Militia (Milisi Bulan Sabit Merah) and among many acts of violence, were responsible for shooting an Italian tourist in August 2002.\(^{135}\)

Among the mujahidin in Poso, Pendolo was known as home to three separate groups: JI, Laskar Jundullah, and Darul Islam. But the problem was that initially, there were two DI factions there. One was led by Kang Jaja and his nephew, Iwan alias Rois. The other was led by an Ajengan Masduki loyalist and protégé of Ahmad Said Maulana's named Syaiful alias Fathurrobi alias Harun, a native of Cilacap, Central Java, near the West Java border. They initially competed for local followers, but eventually, Kang Jaja and his men were able to persuade Harun to join forces.\(^{136}\)

Ring Banten's ties to JI, which increased in Poso in 2000-2002, had been building since the training sessions with Afghan veterans in 1999. They were largely to the men of Mantiqi I, the regional division of JI covering Malaysia and Singapore and led originally by Hambali, because a Mantiqi I man -- Imam Samudra -- as a native of Banten, a close friend and former high school classmate of Ustadz Heri Hafidzin, a Ring member. Heri, who was arrested in connection with Bali bombs, was employed for some years at the Sajira courier company.

The cooperation between JI and Ring Banten meant that the latter could be counted on to provide refuge for JI members coming back from Maluku or fleeing justice. It also led to logistical support in terms of buying weapons and carrying out operations. Sometime during 2000, for example, Imam Samudra reportedly purchased several tons of explosives from a rock-crushing company in Bojonegara, Cilegon, West Java, with funds provided by Zulkarnaen, head of JI's military operations and one of the top leaders still at large. A JI member named Asep alias Darwin, later implicated in the Atrium Mall bombing, reportedly turned the explosives over to Ring Banten for safekeeping.\(^{137}\)

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132 Suryadi Mas'oed, now in prison for his role in the Makassar bombings of December 2002.
133 Crisis Group interviews, December 2004.
134 It had no connection either with the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies or a separate Red Crescent set up by Dr. Basuki of the political party, PKS.
136 Crisis Group interviews, November 2004. From this point on, Harun pops up repeatedly in different guises.
137 Asep alias Darwin was never caught and was at one point reported to be living with another fugitive named Holis, wanted in connection with the Bandung Christmas Eve bombings. He is now believed to be in Mindanao. Holis was...
On 13 September 2001, shortly after the bombing of the Atrium Mall in Jakarta, thirteen young men were arrested in the camp that Kang Jaja had set up in Saketi, Pandeglang, where they were undergoing military training (tadrib), with a few Malaysians as instructors.  

Suryadi Masoed, Syawal Yasin's protégé who had helped Ring Banten acquire weapons from Mindanao, told police that about a month after the Atrium bombing, he met with the Banten group at the house of a man named Tono in Menes, Banten. Imam Samudra, whom he described as the head of Ring Banten, was present. They discussed obtaining arms and explosives from the Philippines and checking out opening a connection to Libya. Suryadi said he received an assignment from Imam Samudra during this meeting to blow up foreign facilities in Makassar or elsewhere in South Sulawesi.  

He also said that in addition to Imam Samudra, Abu Gali from Bandung also headed the group; Abdul Fatah (perhaps the man who was stranded in the Philippines in mid-2000) was head of military operations; and Ustadz Heri Hafidzin was head of dakwah and recruitment of cadres. It was Heri Hafidzin who introduced his old friend Imam Samudra to the young men who robbed the Elita gold shop in Serang on 29 August 2002 to raise funds for the Bali bombing. He also provided the introduction to Iqbal alias Armasan alias Lacong, the suicide bomber for the Paddy's Bar blast, who was also a member of Ring Banten.

C. The Cigarung Recruits

One young man from the old DI stronghold of Cigarung, a hamlet in Kebonpedes village, Sukabumi, West Java, provided the link to the foot soldiers used in the Australian embassy bombing. Cigarung had been known as a stronghold of Masjumi, the reformist Muslim party of the 1950s; today it is better known as a DI base. Didi Gepeng was a DI member who had gone to fight in Poso. He met fellow DI mujahidin from Banten there, and when he returned home--probably in 2001--he invited Kang Jaja to Cigarung.

At the time, one of the most influential men in town was an old DI fighter, Mang Edeng, who lived with Gaos Taufik in North Sumatra in the 1950s, and when he returned, propagated DI ideas to the villagers, as did his son, Kang Abad. Among those he brought to the organisation were the fathers of three embassy bombing suspects: Didin Raidin, father of Heri Golun; Sarkoni, father of Apuy; and Haris, father of Uyok.

When Kang Jaja arrived in Cigarung, he was impressed immediately by the strength of DI, but also by the lack of understanding of jihad. He decided the villagers needed guidance (pembinaan). The man he brought to impart it was none other than Harun, his one-time competitor in Poso. Jaja himself bought land in Gunung Batu, close by Cigarung, and the house he built there became the headquarters of Ring Banten in late 2001.  

Working with the Poso veteran Didi Gepeng, Kang Jaja assigned Harun to recruit local youth. For his part, he provided funding to help them economically, encouraging them to make fish crackers for Rp.15,000-25,000 (about $1.50 to $2) a day, and then buying a motorcycle so they could run a motorcycle-for-hire business.

But the recruitment effort attracted only about seven youths, including Heri Golun, the man who became the suicide bomber on 9 September 2004. The problem, according to local sources, lay with Harun.

Endang from Kasemen, Serang; and Pujata from Kasemen, Serang.

138 Trainees learned the basics of marksmanship, as well as how to use knives and machetes. The road leading to the house in Saketi was rarely used by cars or motorcycles-for-hire. The front of the house was turned into a kind of a repair shop, in part for camouflage purposes, so no one passing would suspect there was military training going on at the back, amidst a hectare of palm trees and banana plantation. The shop also served as a place where the trainees learned to make bombs. Religious study groups, without the military training, were started by the Banten group in at least five other areas around Banten alone: Menes, Ciruas, Kasemen, Benggala, and Kramatwatu. Almost all drew on young men from Islamic high schools. Such schools, housed within pesantrens run by Muslim leaders (kyai) with a history of Darul Islam involvement, were a particularly rich recruiting ground. See Crisis Group Asia Report N°43, Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, 11 December 2002.

139 From testimony of Suryadi Mas'ud, 2 January 2003 in case dossier of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.

140 Heri Hafidzin was head of military operations; and Ustadz Heri Hafidzin was head of dakwah and recruitment of cadres. It was Heri Hafidzin who introduced his old friend Imam Samudra to the young men who robbed the Elita gold shop in Serang on 29 August 2002 to raise funds for the Bali bombing. He also provided the introduction to Iqbal alias Armasan alias Lacong, the suicide bomber for the Paddy's Bar blast, who was also a member of Ring Banten.

141 Its strongholds were in Pandeglang, Bogor, Serang, Sukabumi, Lebak and Krawang districts: Menes (Pandeglang); Cisarua (Bogor); Kasemen (Serang); Kampung Gunung Batu, Kebon Pedes subdistrict (Sukabumi); Desa Gunung Batu, Penggarangan subdistrict, (Lebak); and Cikampek (Karawang).

142 The others were Apuy, Didi Geng, Uyok, Iwan alias Ilhu, Iwang alias Ijul, and Nanang.
Just as he clashed with his fellow DI fighters in Poso, he could not seem to get along with the DI elders in Cigarung, including Mang Edeng.

D. HARUN: THE ONE-MAN LINK TO AMIN, CIMANGGIS, AND BANTEN

One problem was that Harun was growing more radical. He began to find fault with how older DI members practiced Islam in Cigarung, accusing them of unwarranted innovations (bid’ah). At the beginning of 2003, he had encountered a salafi preacher from Jakarta named Oman Rochman alias Aman Abdurrahman, later to be arrested in March 2004 in connection with a bomb-making class in Cimanggis. Harun and Aman met for the first time at the at-Taqwa Mosque in Tanah Abang, known for its congregation of ex-AMIN members. In late 2003, at the end of Ramadan, Harun spoke with Aman about the need for i'dad (preparation for jihad), including what had to be mastered: physical training, weapons training, explosives training, and training in disguise. Harun agreed to instruct some of his followers and proceeded to train about a dozen, most of them college students and part-time donut vendors, in December 2003 and January 2004. This included instruction in making pipe bombs and Molotov cocktails. Harun taught his students that the purpose of pipe bombs was to wound people, not to destroy houses or buildings. It was a technique to be used against infidels (kafir) and hypocrites (munafik) when other means failed. His students said he never specified whom they were to wage jihad against, only that they needed to be ready when the time came.

But in Cigarung, he reportedly spoke of attacking the U.S. and its allies, wherever they were, including in Indonesia, and including civilian men, women, and children, a concept of jihad very much at odds with DI’s. He led his followers in discussions of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine, and had them pray in a small prayer house, separate from the regular mosque, so they would not be tainted by the unacceptable practices of their parents.

He and Kang Jaja apparently continued to get along, however, and Iwan alias Rois participated with his recruits in a military training session sponsored by Ring Banten on Gunung Peti in Pelabuhan Ratu, Sukabumi, in May-June 2004.

After police broke up the Cimanggis group in March 2004 and arrested Aman Abdurrahman, Rois apparently helped Harun and a man from Cigarung named Cholid, also a follower of Aman, flee to Pendolo, to the old training camp on the shore of Lake Poso. The last reports were that even there, Harun annoyed the locals, and he and Cholid were expelled.

A few months later Rois met with two JI friends, graduates of Ngruki, whom he knew from Poso. They invited him to take part in a jihad operation that turned out to be the embassy bombing. Rois agreed and asked a couple of his Cigarung friends and members of Ring Banten from the courier company to take part as well.

The Australian embassy bombing appears to have been a joint operation between parts of the JI structure and the Banten group. While Azhari and Noordin were almost certainly the masterminds, it is unclear whether there was any endorsement from, or even consultation, with the members of the JI central command still at large.

According to the testimony of some of those arrested in connection with the case, Rois, detained in November 2004, was responsible for the field surveys and coordinating with Noordin, the strategist, and Azhari, the field coordinator and bomb builder, including helping them to escape. Agus Ahmad Hidayat, from Cianjur, now under arrest, played a major role in helping move the explosives and protecting Noordin and Azhari.

It was Rois who was reportedly responsible for recruiting suicide bombers from the Banten group to join with JI -- Azhari and Nurdin had already recruited four. Heri Golun alias Agun from Cigarung got the job. Of the seven remaining recruits, three have now been arrested.

143 For an account of Cimanggis group, See Crisis Group Report, Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix, op. cit.
145 Aman provided the capital for the donut project.
147 Ibid.
149 It is not clear to where.
150 One of these friends had been detained there briefly for smuggling ammunition.
151 The eight were Hasan (JI); Gempur alias Jabir, cousin of al-Ghozi (JI); Chandra (JI); Ismail (JI); Agus (Ring Banten); Deni (Ring Banten); Irwan (Ring Banten); and Agun from Sukabumi (Ring Banten).
X. CONCLUSION

No understanding of jihadism in Indonesia is possible without understanding Darul Islam and its very extended family. What began as separate rebellions in West Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh is now one very loose but enduring web of personal contacts that touches most of the major islands in Indonesia. DI and its offshoots and splinters provide the main threads of that web but it also includes fellow travellers: anyone who took part in hijrah with DI, to Jakarta, Lampung, Malaysia, Mindanao, or other places of refuge; anyone who trained with DI in Afghanistan or with DI-JI in Mindanao; any member of JI; anyone who fought alongside DI or JI in Ambon or Poso; anyone who regularly attended DI or JI pengajians; anyone imprisoned for trying to establish an Islamic state; and anyone who went to one of the handful of schools associated with JI.

Not everyone in each of these groups is a potential bomber, of course, and the schools in particular probably turn out more law-abiding citizens than troublemakers. As DI members themselves say, Darul Islam is a house with many rooms -- enough for all the factions. Men and women from rural West Java with traditional, even messianic beliefs, can be housed under the same metaphorical roof with puritanical salafi jihadists, whose practices and methods they may find abhorrent. The ability of both to define themselves as members or spiritual heirs of Darul Islam helps explain the organisation's ability to endure.

Some other important points in understanding the DI-JI linkages are:

- The network is large but finite. It is not something that everyone angry with the U.S. or committed to salafi Islam wants to or would be allowed to join. It expands largely through personal contacts. Shared experience in a jihad -- whether Afghanistan, Ambon, or Poso -- is particularly important.

- Leaders and followers come from across the socio-economic spectrum. The leaders are disproportionately middle-class and well-educated, but the foot soldiers are more varied, and include a few unemployed youth from poor backgrounds as well as the urban educated. Javanese and Sundanese (from West Java) dominate JI itself, but the offshoots, splinters and fellow-travellers include many others.

- The practice of "recycling" militants means that the authorities may need to pay much more attention to what takes place in prison, what becomes of the families, and particularly the children, of detainees, and what happens to jihadists once they are released. The government needs to ensure that prisons do not become a place where radicalisation increases or is reinforced, that committed jihadists are not given free rein to influence other prisoners, but that enough rehabilitation takes place so there is at least a reasonable chance released prisoners will have less lethal career opportunities outside.

- There is a particular need to look more closely at episodes when the older leadership failed the younger generation, and the latter started new recruitment. In many cases, a new militancy seemed to have been sparked by the older leaders' failure to respond to political events that captured the imagination of younger members: the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the Ambon conflict twenty years later are probably the best examples of leadership inaction goading younger militants to take matters into their own hands and producing a burst of new recruits. The DI network gives shape to the new movements that arise and then absorbs much of the overflow when the militancy ebbs.

- DI today is less a well-defined organisation than a network -- and a legacy. Even jihadists, like Harun, who reject its traditions, are in some ways its progeny. It is the legacy that makes Jemaah Islamiyah more an Indonesian than a regional organisation, despite its Malaysian and Singaporean members and its cell in the southern Philippines. It is what ties JI to every other offshoot, including the usroh groups, AMIN, Ring Banten, and the MMI. It explains why a support network continues to exist for the jihadists, even as public anger over their actions grows. And it suggests that JI is almost certainly not the last offspring of this very extended family.

If the pattern outlined above holds, Indonesia will not be able to eradicate JI or its jihadist partners, even if it arrests every member of the central command. But it ought to be able to contain it if:

- communal tensions are properly managed;
- no major centre of international jihadist training emerges;
- law enforcement capacity is improved, and the government gives more serious thought to the impact of prison on jihadists in custody; and
- better control is exerted over the sale and transfer of arms, ammunition, and explosives.

Darul Islam is now 55 years old. It is not going to disappear any time soon.
APPENDIX A

MAP OF INDONESIA
APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INDONESIAN TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMIN</td>
<td>Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (Nusantara Islamic Mujahidin Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAKIN</td>
<td>Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence Coordinating Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCA</td>
<td>Bank Central Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BKPMI</td>
<td>Badan Koordinasi Pemuda Mesjid Indonesia (Coordinating Body of Indonesian Mosque Youth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPMI</td>
<td>Badan Pembangunan Muslimin Indonesia (Body for Indonesian Muslim Development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bid'ah</td>
<td>in Islamic law, unwarranted innovations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cisarua</td>
<td>name of place outside Bogor, West Java, where important Darul Islam meeting was held, December 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI, D2, and D3</td>
<td>designations by Darul Islam commanders of geographic areas according to extent of the organisation's control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDII</td>
<td>Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Darul Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fa'i</td>
<td>robbing non-believers as a way of raising funds for jihad</td>
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<tr>
<td>fillah</td>
<td>with Allah, designation given non-violent, non-military faction of DI</td>
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<tr>
<td>fisabilillah</td>
<td>in the path of Allah, short for jihad in the path of Allah, designation for DI factions committed to use of armed force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gontor</td>
<td>pesantren in East Java famous for progressive teaching methods, especially in English and Arabic, that has produced some of Indonesia's best-known Islamic leaders from across the ideological spectrum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hijrah</td>
<td>flight or emigration from an area where Islamic law cannot be upheld to one where it can be, as in the Prophet's hijrah from Mecca to Medina.</td>
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<tr>
<td>i'dad</td>
<td>preparation for jihad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ikrar Bersama</td>
<td>Joint Proclamation of 32 Darul Islam leaders renouncing the DI struggle and affirming their loyalty to the Indonesian republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ilmu laduni</td>
<td>mystical religious knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iman</td>
<td>faith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>Jemaah Islamiyah</td>
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<tr>
<td>jihad</td>
<td>holy war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kafir</td>
<td>infidel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khilafatul Muslimin</td>
<td>Muslim Caliphate, name of organisation founded by Abdul Qadir Baraja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KISDI</td>
<td>A Muslim solidarity organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Komando Jihad</td>
<td>DI campaign initiated in 1976 with BAKIN encouragement</td>
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<tr>
<td>komando wilayah (KW)</td>
<td>regional divisions of DI</td>
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<tr>
<td>kompi</td>
<td>company, a military organisational term</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMJ</td>
<td>Korps Muballigh Jakarta (Jakarta Islamic Preachers Corps)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPSI</td>
<td>Komandan Perang Seluruh Indonesia, overall DI military commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laskar Jundullah</td>
<td>militia formed in South Sulawesi in 1999 that fought in the communal conflicts in Ambon and Poso</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LP3K Lembaga Pendidikan Pengembangan Pesantren Kilat (Institute for the Development of Intensive Short Religious Study)

masjid dhiror mosques built on sinful premises or in such a way as to divide the ummat

Misi Islam pesantren in the Tanjung Priok area of Jakarta

MMI Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia

muhajirin emigres, exiles (from same root as hijrah)

munafik hypocrite

NII Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State) proclaimed by DI in 1949

NIT Negara Islam Tejamaya (Tejamaya Islamic State): movement in Tasikmalaya area, late 1960s

oknum rogue, often used to designate individual rather than institutional responsibility for a criminal action

Operasi Sabang-Merauke unit that took over the city of Medan during PRRI rebellion in March 1958

Opsus Operasi Khusus, Special Operations Service headed in 1970s by Soeharto intelligence adviser Ali Moertopo

PADI Pasukan Darul Islam, Darul Islam forces

pengajian religious study session

pesantren Islamic boarding school

pesantren kilat literally "lightning schools" but referring to intensive short-term religious study

petrus pembunuhan misterius, mysterious killings, a government anti-crime program characterised by the summary execution of suspected criminals

PRRI Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia)

PRTI Pengerakan Rumah Tangga Islam, an organisation founded in 1968 or 1969 with the goal of consolidating and reactivating the DI leadership

PT Pindad Indonesian military munitions factory, Bandung, West Java

Rabitah al-Alam al-Islami World Muslim League based in Saudi Arabia

Ring in DI parlance, a group established outside the command structure of the area in which it is based

Ring Ancol group founded by Nur Hidayat in North Jakarta that formed the core of the 1989 Lampung activists

Ring Condet DI usroh groups in Jakarta 1984-1986 under command of KW2 (Abdullah Sungkar)

Ring Santa usroh groups in Jakarta, 1984-1986 with heavy involvement of preman or gang members

RPPI Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia, United Islamic Republic of Indonesia, proclaimed by Kahar Muzakkar in 1962

Sajira Media Karsa courier company owned by Ring Banten figures

shodaqoh Islamic donations

tadrib military training

ummat community of the Muslim faithful

usroh literally, family, but concept developed by Hasan al-Banna of Muslim Brotherhood of small groups living by Islamic principles and law that would become the building blocks of Islamic society

wangsit Siliwangi prophecy of fifteenth century Sundanese king
APPENDIX C

INDEX OF NAMES

Abdul Fatah Wirananggapati

Abdul Ghani Masykur
Sumbawa contact of group around Warsidi in Lampung incident 1989.

Abdul Qadir Baraja

Abdul Rauf alias Sam
member of Banten group arrested after the Bali bombing in connection with robbing of a gold store, the proceeds of which went toward the bombing. Grandson of Haji Rais.

Abdullah Said
South Sulawesi protege of Aceng Kurnia, founder of Hidayatullah pesantren in Gunung Tambak, outside Balikpapan, East Kalimantan.

Abdullah Sungkar

Abdullah Umar

Abi Surachman

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir alias Abdus Samad

Abu Darda
see Dodo.
Abu Dujana
native of Cianjur, secretary of Mantiqi II; consulted by Azhari and Noordin Mohamed Top in connection with bombing of Marriott hotel, August 2003. Student of Dadang Hafidz, possibly Afghan veteran.

Abu Dzar

Abu Fatih
alias of Abdullah Anshori alias Ibnu Thoyib. Native of Pacitan, East Java, former Ngruki teacher, helped found Abdullah Sungkar's usroh groups in Jakarta; sentenced to nine years in prison, released in 1993, became head of JI's Mantiqi II, reportedly opposed to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's taking on leadership of MMI.

Abu Gali
mentioned in 2003 by Suryadi Masoed as head of Ring Banten, together with Imam Samudra. Originally from Bandung.

Abu Jibril

Abu Rusdan (sometimes seen as Abu Rusydan) alias Thoriquuddin
JI Mantiqi II figure who took over as caretaker amir of JI in 2000 when Abu Bakar Ba'asyir became more active with MMI.

Abu Toto
see Panji Gumilang.

Aceng Kurnia alias Aam

Achmad Furzon
see Broto

Achmad Hussein
from Kudus, reportedly present at induction of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir into DI, 1976; member of DI's Imamate Council 1979; father of Taufik Ahmad, arrested and briefly detained, September 2003 on suspicion of DI involvement. Now dead.

Addah Djaelani Tirtapraja

Agung Riyadi
sometimes misspelled Agung Biyadi, fled to Malaysia in April 1985 with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, arrested there in January 2002 under the ISA. Brother of Fajar Sidiq, member of editorial board of ar-Risalah, newsletter published in 1980s by Irfan Awwas.

Agus Abdullah Sukunsari
Agus Ahmad Hidayat

Agus Sulaeman Lubis
chief of staff of DI-Medan in 1976.

Ahmad Sajuli
JI member detained Malaysia under the ISA, former member of Condet usroh group, Afghan veteran.

Ahmad Saridup

Ahmad Sayid Maulana
member of AMIN. Known as a leader of the DI mujahidin in Maluku, together with Abu Dzar. Also a member of RPII, Mindanao veteran, man who took Bali bombers Dulmatin and Umar Patek to Mindanao. Arrested in Sabah in September 2003.

Ajengan Kecil (Ajengan Cilik)
alias for Kyai Syaiful Malik. In and out of prison, belonged to DI faction loyal to Abdul Fatah Wirananggpati, now linked with Emeng Abdurahman alias Ali Mahfudz.

Ajengan Masduki

Ale A.T
fighter with Kahar Muzakkar, then DI commander for Sulawesi and eastern Indonesia; now lives in Jakarta. Reportedly mentor to Agus Dwikarna.

Ali Imron
convicted Bali bomber, brother of Amrozi and Muchlas.

Ali Moertopo

Aman Abdurahman

Amrozi
the "smiling bomber", sentenced to death for involvement in October 2002 Bali bombs.

Aos Firdaus
DI member, lived in Tanjung Priok area after release, active in Ring Condet and Ring Santa in Jakarta 1985 with Broto.

Apuy
alias of Syaiful Bahri, Ring Banten member from Cigarung, Sukabumi, recruited by Harun, involved in September 2004 Jakarta bombing. Arrested November 2004 in Bogor.
Asadullah
a founder of Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (AMIN), militant DI member recruited by Yoyok, sent for training in Mindanao 1998.

Asep alias Darwin
JI member who worked with Ring Banten in 2000 to safeguard large cache of explosives. Involved in Atrium Mall bombing, August 2001. At one point thereafter reported to be living with another fugitive, Holis, wanted in connection with the Bandung Christmas Eve bombings. Now believed to be in Mindanao.

Ateng Djaelani Setiawan
DI commander, signed the Joint Proclamation, 1962. His installation on DI's Imamate Council, 1974, led to fillah-fisabilillah split in organisation.

Azhari Husin
Malaysian national, JI member, master bomb technician, as of February 2005 being sought in connection with Christmas Eve 2000 bombings in Batam as well as Bali, Marriott, and Australian embassy bombings. Mechanical engineering student, Adelaide University, Australia; 1979-1984, studied at University of Technology, Malaysia (UTM); PhD, Reading University, UK, 1990 in property valuation; professor at UTM, 1991. Lived in Jakarta 1996; board of JI's Lukmanul Hakiem pesantren, Johor; instructor in Mindanao, 1999; explosives training, Afghanistan, 2000.

Bardan Kintarto

Broto alias Achmad Furzon
Yogyakarta native, close to Ajengan Masduki, active in Ring Condet; as top staff member of Mia Ibrahim, instrumental in sending DI recruits to Afghanistan mid-1980s; crossed over to Tahmid Rahmat Basuki's faction in 1998.

Chandra
a JI member from East Java, recruited as suicide bomber for September 2004 bombing.

Cholid
follower of Aman Abdurahman, reportedly fled with Harun to Pendolo, Central Sulawesi after March 2004 explosion in Cimanggis.

Dadang Surachman alias Dadang Hafizd

Danu Muhamad Hassan
top DI commander from Tasikmalaya, signed Joint Proclamation 1962. Ended up working for intelligence agency BAKIN, instrumental in getting BAKIN funds for reactivation of DI, 1970s. Imprisoned in connection with Komando Jihad, died mysteriously immediately after his release.

Daud Beureueh
leader of DI rebellion in Aceh; chosen DI imam in Mahoni meeting, 1974; arrested May 1978; died March 1993.

Didi Gepeng
DI activist in Cigarung, fought in Poso, introduced Kang Jaja and Harun to the DI community in Cigarung.

Didin Raidin
father of Heri Golun, suicide bomber in September 2004 Jakarta bombing; recruited into DI by Mang Edeng.

Djaelani
see Adah Djaelani.
Djaja Sujadi Wijaya  
DI leader, native of Garut, signer of the Joint Proclamation 1962; formed non-violent filah wing of DI in 1975 in Limbangan, Garut; killed in 1978 by followers of Adah Djaelani.

Dodo Mohammed Darda, also known as Dodo Kartosoewirjo  
son of DI founder, commander of Bantala Senta; arrested 1962; signed Joint Proclamation.

Dulmatin  
one of most-wanted Bali bombers, believed to be in Philippines as of February 2005, target of Philippines Armed Forces bombing raids, November 2004 and January 2005.

Edy Rianto  
AMIN member from Jatinegara, Jakarta, who took part in bank robberies, 1999.

Edy Taufik  
AMIN member who took part in bank robberies, 1999.

Emeng Abdurrahman  
alias Ali Mahfudz, was member of Warman's special force, arrested in connection with Komando Jihad, joined Abdul Fatah Wirananggpati faction after release. In 1997 replaced Wirananggpati as imam.

Empon  
now dead, member of West Java special forces unit of Komando Jihad, reportedly hit man in Djaja Sujadi murder, 1978. Native of Tasikmalaya.

Farid Ghozali  
member of Warman's special forces; killed by Indonesian forces in January 1979, allegedly after betrayal by Hasan Bauw.

Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi  
Jl member, Madiun native, son of DI member Zainuri; brother of JI member Muhajir alias Idris; Pondok Ngruki graduate; Afghan veteran, class of 1990; instructor in Jl's Camp Hudaibiyah, Mindanao from 1995; involved in several JI bombings including attack on Philippines ambassador to Jakarta 2000, Rizal Day bombing in Manila 30 December 2000; arrested Jan 2002 in Manila; escaped July 2003 from Camp Crame, Manila. Shot and killed in October 2003.

Fauzi Hasby  
head of Republik Islam Aceh, killed in Ambon Feb 2003.

Fauzi Isman  
former member of Ring Ancol, detained in connection with Lampung incident, 1989.

Fihiruddin  
see Abu Jibril.

Firdaus alias Azzam alias Nyong Ali  
briefly detained in July 2003 on weapons charges. Afghan veteran 1987-1991; studied with Abdullah Azzam; involved in military training program for KW9 1999 in which Kang Jaja took part; reportedly involved in smuggling ammunition to Poso, 2000; volunteer in medical aid charity MER-C.

Gaos Taufik  
born Garut, 1930; elementary school plus four years in pesantren; joined Hizbullah 1947, then DI; arrested 1954; forcibly transmigrated to Rantau Prapat, North Sumatra 1956; since 1974, overall DI military commander; founded Komando Jihad; detained 1977-1987;active in DI since release.

Hadidi  
member of first "class" from Ring Banten sent to Mindanao in 1999, arrested off coast of Sulawesi on way home in Feb 2000.

Haji Faleh  
native of Kudus; commander of KW2 in 1970s, arrested in connection with Komando Jihad; father of JI member Thoriqudin alias Abu Rusdan.
Haji Ismail Pranoto
see Hispran.

Hambali
former head of JI's Mantiqi I, former GPI member from Cianjur, arrested in Thailand, August 2003, implicated in virtually every major bombing undertaken by JI.

Haris
DI member from Cigarung, Sukabumi, father of Uyok, one of young men recruited into Ring Banten by Harun and Kang Jaja.

Haris Fadillah
see Abu Dzar.

Harun

Hasan aias Purnomo alias Agung
JI member from Surabaya recruited as potential suicide bomber for September 2004 Jakarta bombing. Arrested November 2004 in Bogor.

Hasan al-Banna
founder of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, originator of usroh concept

Heri Golun
suicide bomber in September 2004 bombing outside Australian embassy, Jakarta; member of Ring Banten

Heri Hafidzin
member of Ring Banten, friend of Imam Samudra, arrested in aftermath of 2002 Bali bombings.

Hispran (Haji Ismail Pranoto)
born Brebes, one of original DI fighters, never surrendered; involved in trying to re-establish links between West Java and Aceh branches of DI in late 1960s; active in recruiting new members in Central and East Java, 1975-1977; inducted Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar into DI, 1976; arrested in Blitar, 1977; tried, sentenced to death 1978 for Komando Jihad activities, died in prison.

Ibu Thoyib alias Abu Fatih

Iliyas Liwa
member of DI-Lampung, originally from South Sulawesi.

Imam Samudra
Bali bomber, appears to have been member of both JI and Ring Banten. Sentenced to death 2003.

Iqbal alias Arnasan alias Lacong
suicide bomber in October 2002 Bali bombing, member of Ring Banten.

Irfan Awwas Suryahardy
born in Tirpas-Selong village, East Lombok, 1960; attended Gontor pesantren; edited ar-Risalah newsletter in early 1980s; arrested on subversion charges, sentenced in 1984 to thirteen years in prison, served nine. Head of executive committee of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI); brother of Fihiruddin alias Abu Jibril alias Iqbal bin Abdurrahman

Isa Bugis
native of Pidie, Aceh, known for idiosyncratic Islamic teachings followed by some members of DI's KW9 in the 1970s. Founder of movement known as Islam Pembaru.
Ismail
JI member recruited as potential suicide bomber for September 2004 Jakarta bombing.

Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois

Jabir alias Gempur alias Nanang
JI member from Madiun, cousin of Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, student at Darusyahada pesantren in Boyolali, Solo; recruited as suicide bomber in September 2004 for Australian embassy bombing but not deployed. Reportedly protege of Azhari Husin and Noordin Mohamad Top. Believed to have nearly severed thumb in accidental bomb explosion in Cicurug, Sukabumi on 15 October 2004.

Jabir, Mohammed
DI fighter from South Sulawesi, moved to Java after defeat of Kahar Muzakkar forces, married Aceng Kurnia's daughter; settled in Tajung Priok, hosted bomb-making classes for Komando Jihad recruits in 1976, arrested in late 1985 in Makassar on charges of plotting to kill Soeharto, died in custody, possibly as a result of torture, in January 1986.

Jaelani
see Adah Djaelani; Ateng Djaelani Setiawan.

Kadar Solihat
DI regimental vice commander (Commander 2, KW1) in Tasikmalaya-Garut area during 1950s; together with Djaja Sujadi, founder in 1974 of non-violent fillah faction of DI. Native of Tasikmalaya. Died 1996.

Kahar Muzakkar (also seen as Qahar and Qahhar)
founder of DI rebellion in South Sulawesi, killed by Indonesian army 1965 but body never produced.

Kang Abad
senior DI leader in Cigarung, Sukabumi. Son of Mang Adeng.

Kang Jaja alias Akhdam
founder of Ring Banten, breakaway faction of DI; businessman, part owner of Sajira Media Karsa courier company, joined DI in 1980s, became donor to KW9 activities under Mahfud Siddiq, began giving DI cadres military training 1996; underwrote KW9's Mindanao training 1999; broke with KW9, 2000; active in Poso, Central Sulawesi 2000-2001. Believed to be close to Syawal Yasin of Sulawesi jihadist groups.

Karim Hasan

Karsidi alias Mansur alias Atang Sutisna bin Sahidin
DI member of Condet group; founded own group after Condet disbanded; distributor of ar-Risalah newsletter in Jakarta, mid-1980s; arrested April 2003 in Banyumas with Dadang Hafidz.

Kartosoewirjo, Soekarmadji Maridjan
leader of the Darul Islam rebellion in West Java, born 1907 in Cepu (near border of Central and East Java), executed 1962. Subject of numerous biographies and studies.

Kartosoewirjo, Tahmid
see Tahmid.

Mahasin Zaini
active in usroh in Central Java in 1980s, now in MMI.

Mahfud Siddiq
Current commander of KW 9. Ring Banten had been under his direction until it broke away in 2000. Loyal to Tahmid Rahmat Basuki.
Mamin alias Ustadz Haris
First student of Aceng Kurnia, taken on as state secretary in Ajengan Masduki's cabinet. As of February 2005, candidate to replace Masduki as imam.

Mang Edeng
former DI fighter, led recruitment effort in Cigarung, Sukabumi, West Java.

Matori Abdul Jalil
head of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) 1999 when attacked by AMIN; former defence minister in Megawati government,

Mia Ibrahim

Mochamad Achwan
installed as head of Malang branch of BPMI in Feb 1981. Later arrested for involvement in church bombings in Malang on Christmas Eve 1984 and participation in meetings where plot to kill Soeharto was allegedly discussed. As of early 2005, member of MMI-East Java.

Muchlas
convicted Bali bomber, brother of Amrozi and Ali Imron.

Muchliansyah alias Solihin

Mursalin Dahlan
Bandung native, member of PPI and DI, helped introduce usroh concept to Abdullah Sungkar's followers in Yogyakarta in late 1970s.

Noordin Mohammed Top
Malaysian JI member, reportedly chief strategist in Marriott and September 2004 Jakarta bombings.

Nunung Nurul Ichsan
Born Tasikmalaya, usroh leader in Jakarta in 1970s, co-founder of Institute for Development of Indonesian Muslims (Badan Pembangunan Muslimin Indonesia, BPMI), now dead.

Nur Hidayat
gang leader in Jakarta in 1980s, member of Ring Santa in Pasar Santa, Jakarta; founded Ring Ancol, North Jakarta, in 1987 and went on to try and reactivate DI, starting in Lampung in 1989. Remains an active gang member, formed Front Pembela Rakyat to work for Megawati in 2004 elections.

Nurudin alias Zaid Butong

Nursyahid alias Jaka
born in eastern Flores, DI member, reportedly introduced Kyai Syamsuri to AMIN founder Yoyok. As of mid-2004, ran Ring Jaka in Bekasi, outside Jakarta.

Oman Rochman
see Aman Abdurahman.

Opa Mustopa
West Java DI commander; tried to revive DI in 1967 in Rajapolah, Tasikmalaya, arrested and imprisoned for three years. Re-arrested in connection with Komando Jihad activities. Now dead.
Panji Gumilang alias Abu Toto (real name Abdus Salam bin Rasyidi)  

Pepen  
see Slamet Widodo.

Pikar  
see Zulfikar.

Pitut Soeharto  
army colonel active in Special Operations (OPSUS), supported large DI reunion in 1971 at which ex members were urged to support Golkar.

Qahar Muzakkar  
see Kahar Muzakkar.

Rois  
see Iwan alias Rois.

Sanusi, Ir. H. Mohamad  

Sarkoni  
DI member from Cigarung, Sukabumi, father of Apuy, arrested in connection with September 2004 Jakarta bombing.

Shobbarin Syakur  
former usroh detainee, now MMI official.

Slamet Widodo  

Sobari, Ahmad  
DI district head (bupati) of Priangan Timur, founder of Islamic State of Tejamaya, around Tasikmalaya in 1969.

Sudarsono  

Sukri  
Komando Jihad commander in Lampung who led a prison mutiny after his arrest.

Suryadi Masoed (also seen as Mas'oed and Mas'ud) alias Umar alias Anthoni Salim  

Syaiful alias Fathurrobi alias Harun  
see Harun.

Syawal Yasin alias Salim Yasin alias Abu Seta alias Mahmud alias Muhamad mubarok alias Muhammad Syawal  
one of first Indonesians to arrive in Afghanistan 1985, became instructor; son-in-law of Abdullah Sungkar but not formally JI member; key figure in Wahdah Islamiyah, Makassar, said to have own militia. Close to Kang Jaja of Ring Banten.
Tahmid Rahmat Basuki, also seen as Tahmid Kartosoewirjo

Tajul Arifin alias Sabar alias Pipin
member of AMIN, originally from Banten, responsible for 1999 attack on Matori Abdul Jalil.

Thoriquddin
see Abu Rusdan.

Timsar Zubil

Toha Mahfud

Ujeng
head of DI Lampung cell in late 1970s when Warman was active.

Ules Sudjai
DI commander, signer of the Joint Proclamation 1962; became Commander II for West Java in DI reorganisation after 1974 Mahoni meeting; member of Imamate Council and head of Java-Madura command, 1979; arrested in connection with Komando Jihad, currently allied with Abu Toto of breakaway KW9.

Umar Patek
one of Bali bombers still at large as of February 2005, believed to be in Mindanao.

Utomo alais Abu Faruq

Uyok
Ciagarung youth, recruited into Ring Banten around 2002 by Harun and Kang Jaja.

Wahidin
member of Ring Ancol who became involved in Lampung incident, 1989.

Warman, Asep alias Musa
DI fighter from Garut, born 1929. Moved to Lampung in 1950s after arrest by Indonesian army. Active in DI-Lampung in 1970s, recruited by Gaos Taufik for Komando Jihad special forces; becomes known for fa'i raids (robberies to raise funds for DI). Killed in 1981 by Indonesian forces.

Warsidi
head of a religious school in Way Jepara, Lampung that became site of effort by young Jakarta- and Ngruki-based usroh members to establish new Islamic community, then site of bloody siege by Indonesian army in 1989.

Yoyok alias Danu alias Abdul Rosyid
preman (gang member) who joined Condet group; one of the founders of the Abu Bakar Battalion, led AMIN.

Zaenal Abidin
native of Tasikmalaya, commander of Regiment II, DI's Sunan Rahmat Division, 1950; surrendered 6 March 1962; signed Joint Proclamation, 1962; together with Ateng Djaelani, became subject of rift within DI when taken on to DI's Imamate Council in 1974 because seen as having betrayed movement after surrender.

Zulfiqar
militant DI member from Tanjung Priok, recruited by Yoyok in Jakarta, sent for training in Mindanao 1998.
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